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ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS IN HEALTH ECONOMICS 
BY 
DEREK RYAN HOODIN 
MAY 2021 
Committee Chair: Dr. James Marton 
Major Department: Economics 
This dissertation consists of three chapters, each of which examines a different topic 
within the sphere the health economics.  
In the first chapter, I use unique, proprietary medical practice data from 2019 to 
investigate the relationship between physicians, various categories of non-physician clinical 
staff, and other non-labor inputs in the production of patient office visits. Preliminary results 
suggest that, for some inputs, their marginal productivity has fallen over time. Cross-input 
elasticities generally match in terms of their historical classification as either compliments or 
substitutes, although the magnitudes of the elasticities have also fallen over time. One possible 
interpretation of these results is that medical practices have already adapted to changes in the 
economic, regulatory, and technological environment in which they practice and have achieved 
the easy efficiency gains that were once readily available to them. 
In the second chapter, I use 17 years of hospital cost report data and a difference-in-
differences identification strategy to examine the financial performance and utilization of safety-
net hospitals in Massachusetts following the state’s 2006 reform. The results suggest the largest 
safety-net hospitals experienced a decline in patient revenue because of the reform and may have 
responded by transferring operations from inpatient facilities to outpatient centers as a cost-
cutting maneuver. Other safety-net hospitals, however, did not experience the same decline in 
patient revenue. Should states need to reduce their supplemental payments to safety-net hospitals 
as part of national health care reform, these results suggest they should target their remaining 
funds to their most financially vulnerable safety-net hospitals. 
The final chapter, co-authored with James Marton and Benjamin Ukert, evaluates the 
impact of the Affordable Care Act Medicaid expansion on health insurance coverage, access to 
care, and self-reported health for individuals with and without chronic conditions. Using five 
years of post-reform data (2014–2018) from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System and 
a difference-in-differences identification strategy, we find that the reform led to improvements in 
access to care and self-reported health for both groups. Although these improvements are mostly 
larger in magnitude for individuals with chronic conditions, the differences in magnitude are not 
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The health care industry is in a constant state of transition. It is always adapting to new 
legislation, new health care technology, and to changes in the underlying health of the population 
it serves. The three chapters in this dissertation focus on how just some of these changes have 
transformed health care, for both providers and patients. The first chapter explores the 
organization and staffing of doctor offices. The second chapter examines the short- and long-
term effects of the 2006 Massachusetts health care reform on the financial performance and 
utilization of the state’s safety-net hospitals. Lastly, the third chapter investigates how the 2010 
Affordable Care Act impacted access to care and self-reported health outcomes for individuals 
with chronic conditions. 
The Affordable Care Act conferred insurance to millions of Americans just as the baby 
boomer generation began to retire. As a result, many health policy analysts have raised the alarm 
that the US health care system is unprepared to meet growing patient demand. One potential 
avenue to meet this growing demand is to revisit the organization and staffing of doctor offices. 
Because of a lack of available US data, the most recent studies on this topic use data from the 
1980s, and physicians today practice medicine in a very different economic, regulatory, and 
technological environment than they did 40 years ago. The first chapter in this dissertation 
therefore uses unique, proprietary medical practice data from 2019 to explore the relationships 
between physicians, various categories of non-physician clinical staff, and other non-labor inputs 
in the production process for patient office visits. 
Preliminary results suggest that, for some inputs, their marginal productivity has fallen 
over time. Similarly, while many of the cross-input elasticities match in terms of their historical 
classification as either complements or substitutes, their magnitude has also fallen over time. 
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One possible interpretation of these results is that medical practices have already adjusted the 
size and skill mix of their clinical workforce, in addition to making other organizational 
improvements, to achieve the easy efficiency gains that were once readily available to them. 
Policymakers will want to use this information as they consider different methods to increase 
health care capacity, such as strengthening government support for graduate medical education 
or adjusting the scope-of-practice laws that limit the autonomy of non-physician clinical staff. 
The second chapter revisits the 2006 Massachusetts health care reform in order to gain 
some insight into the likely consequences of one of the provisions of the Affordable Care Act 
that will soon be enacted. Specifically, the federal government is scheduled in 2021 to cut $4 
billion in supplemental payments to safety-net hospitals, which are those that have traditionally 
cared for many low-income and uninsured patients. Further reductions of $8 billion are set to 
occur every year from 2022 through 2025. These payments are being withdrawn to help pay for 
the Medicaid expansions and the subsidies on the insurance exchanges. However, not every state 
has decided to expand Medicaid, and this leaves their so-called safety-net hospitals financially 
vulnerable. 
Previous studies that examined safety-net hospitals in Massachusetts following the state’s 
reform limited to their analysis to a select handful of safety-net hospitals and only had one or two 
years of post-reform data at their disposal. By contrast, I examine the impact of the reform using 
multiple sets of criteria for identifying safety-net hospitals and employ a much longer time 
frame. The results suggest the largest providers of uncompensated care did suffer a financial 
setback because of the reform and, in an attempt to restore their financial health, may have 
responded by transferring operations to outpatient settings. Other safety-net hospitals, however, 
do not appear to have suffered financial losses to the same degree. When the federal reductions 
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occur, states may wish to target their remaining funds to their largest safety-net hospitals. 
Similarly, non-expansion states may wish to reconsider adopting the Medicaid expansion. 
The third chapter, co-authored with James Marton and Benjamin Ukert, evaluates the 
impact of the Affordable Care Act Medicaid expansion on health insurance coverage, access to 
care, and self-reported health outcomes for vulnerable and chronically ill individuals using data 
from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System. We focus on these individuals because 
their chronic conditions may have prevented them from obtaining health insurance and accessing 
health care before the reform. Using five years of post-reform data between 2014–2018 and a 
difference-in-differences identification strategy, we find that the expansions led to improvements 
in access to care among both those with and without chronic conditions. While the magnitude of 
these improvements are mostly larger for those with a chronic condition, the differences in 
magnitude are not statistically significant. We also find statistically significant improvements in 
self-assessed health for those without chronic conditions. Finally, we find larger improvements 
in access to care among those with chronic conditions in states with higher-than-average pre-
reform uninsured rates, though these gains in access did not translate to improvements in self-
assessed health for this group. 
Economists have long documented many unique features of the health care industry 
which make it distinct from other sectors of the economy. Some examples include the 
asymmetric information between patients and insurers and between patients and providers, as 
well as the positive and negative externalities of good and bad health, among other market 
failures. Policymakers often introduce new pieces of legislation with the aim of minimizing the 
costs associated with these market failures. Providers then adjust their operations in response to 
the new policies or other changing dynamics within the health care landscape. When health 
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policy professionals speak of the Triple Aim, they are referring to improving the patient 
experience, improving the health of populations, and reducing the per capita costs of health care. 
As the industry evolves, new research will always be needed to ensure any changes deliver on 











For over a decade, there has been widespread concern that the American health care 
system is unprepared to meet growing patient demand. In 2008, the Bureau of Health Professions 
released a report arguing that the overall demand for medical services would grow faster than the 
supply (HRSA 2008). A 2013 report reached the same conclusion, and numerous health policy 
experts and industry professionals have made similar predictions (Hofer, Abraham, and 
Moscovice 2011; Kirch, Henderson, and Dill 2012; Petterson et al. 2012; 2015; Salsberg 2013; 
Zhang et al. 2020; AAMC 2019). For example, Petterson et al. (2015) expect there will be a 
shortage of more than 33,000 primary care physicians by 2035. In addition, other studies have 
suggested a nursing shortage of 918,232 by 2030 (Juraschek et al. 2019). 
 These predictions are based on concurrent changes occurring in the supply and demand 
for health care.1 On the demand side, the 2010 Affordable Care Act conferred insurance to 60 
million Americans just as the Baby Boomer generation began to retire (Obama 2016; Vespa, 
Medina, and Armstrong 2020). On the supply side, the physicians and nurses are also older and, 
due to increasing administrative tasks, many are suffering from burnout and working fewer hours 
than they did in the past (Aiken, Cheung, and Olds 2009; Juraschek et al. 2019; Rao et al. 2017; 
Staiger 2010). The nursing profession, which is predominately female, also suffers from high 
turnover, attrition related to career and family choices, and a faculty shortage in nursing schools 
(Aiken, Cheung, and Olds 2009). 
 
1 For an overview of the methods used to make these projections, see  Lopes, Almeida, and Almada-Lobo (2015). 
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 Perhaps the clearest way to increase health care capacity is to increase the supply of 
doctors, as they are often seen as the main input in the production process for health care. Indeed, 
the 115th Congress introduced several pieces of legislation designed to increase federal support 
for graduate medical education (see H.R. 2267, S. 1301, and H.R. 6056). Producing more 
doctors, however, is a long and expensive process: a medical student must complete four years of 
undergraduate education, then four years of medical school, and then three to five more years of 
residency training, depending on the specialty (MEDPAC 2009). 
 As an alternative to producing more physicians, others have suggested that non-physician 
labor can be used more effectively. Alleviating the shortage, they say, may require greater 
reliance on nurse practitioners and physician assistants—staff sometimes referred to as advanced 
practice providers (APPs) (Auerbach et al. 2013; Sarzynski and Barry 2019). For example, 
Bodenheimer and Smith (2013) write that “Primary care practices could greatly increase their 
capacity to meet patient demand if they reallocate clinical responsibilities… to nonphysician 
team members and to patients themselves.” Surveys of patient preferences indicate that patients 
may be willing to receive more care from other clinical staff (Dill et al. 2013). 
 Compared to nurses, APPs are more highly trained clinical staff. They carry out many 
tasks similar to doctors while working with them but not independently from them (Sibbald, 
Laurant, and Scott 2006). Numerous studies indicate APPs can provide the same quality of care 
as doctors when handling first-time patient encounters and treating more common illnesses 
(Horrocks 2002; Kurtzman and Barnow 2017; Lovink et al. 2017; Yang et al. 2018). It is worth 
noting that the studies described above focus exclusively on labor inputs, rather than considering 
both labor and non-labor inputs, such as capital or technology. Very little research has directly 
examined the extent to which the labor inputs of a modern medical practice (including 
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physicians, APPs, registered nurses (RNs), licensed practical nurses (LPNs), certified nurse 
assistants (CNAs), etc.) as well as non-labor inputs (capital, technology) may serve as 
compliments or substitutes in the production of office visits.   
 This study estimates a production function for patient office visits in order to examine the 
complementarity and substitutability of various labor and non-labor inputs in the production 
process. Uwe Reinhardt was the first researcher to apply production function theory to patient 
office visits in the US in this way (Reinhardt 1972). In his seminal paper, he models office visits 
as a function of physician time, other labor inputs, and office characteristics. His results show 
that offices could, at the time of his study, profitably increase their patient volume by 
substituting doctor time with more nurse time. 
 Thurston and Libby (2002) revisit Reinhardt’s study using data from the 1980s and a new 
production function. Their chosen function, the generalized linear production function developed 
by Diewert (1971), is written as a series of cross-products wherein each input is separately 
multiplied by itself and all other inputs. These cross-product terms allow Thurston and Libby 
(2002) to examine complementarity in the production process. For example, of the ten input pairs 
they consider, they find six are complements and four are substitutes. More recent studies tend to 
rely on the empirical framework developed by Reinhardt (1972) and Thurston and Libby (2002), 
but use data from outside the United States (Olsen et al. 2013; Sarma, Devlin, and Hogg 2009).2 
 My study estimates the same production function as Thurston and Libby (2002) but uses 
unique, proprietary data on today’s medical practices provided by the American Medical Group 
Association (AMGA). These data are more granular than the data used in previous studies, and 
the more detailed information is leveraged on both sides of the production function. First, output 
 
2 Older studies that use Reinhardt’s production function include Brown (1988), Hurdle and Pope (1989), Gaynor and 
Pauly (1990), Headen (1991), DeFelice and Bradford (1997), and Conrad et al. (2002). 
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is measured as both patient office visits and work relative value units (RVUs, a productivity 
measure used by Medicare to calculate physician fees). Second, three separate models of 
increasing specificity are estimated for each output measure. In the first model, APPs and nurses 
are combined into one category in the production function. This is done so that the estimates can 
be easily compared to the earlier estimates from Thurston and Libby (2002). In the second 
model, APPs and nurses are separated into their own categories. Finally, in the third model, 
nurses are subdivided even further into three categories (RNs, LPNs, and CNAs). 
 Preliminary results using data from 2019 show that regression-based estimates of 
marginal productivity have declined for some inputs over time. For example, in the 1980s one 
additional hour of physician time was associated with one and one-third additional patient office 
visits per week (Thurston and Libby 2002). Now, one additional hour of physician time is 
associated with less than a tenth of a visit. Similarly, when nurses and APPs are combined into 
one category, the hiring of an additional nurse is associated with slightly more than four office 
visits per week. Before, the hiring of an additional nurse was associated with over seven and a 
half more visits (Thurston and Libby 2002). When work RVUs are used as the output measure, 
the results are generally similar but larger in magnitude. 
 The 2019 results also indicate the productive relationships between the inputs may be 
changing over time. If two inputs are q-complements, then the presence of one raises the 
productivity of the other. Alternatively, if two inputs are q-substitutes, then the presence of one 
lowers the productivity of the other. Input pairs which may be q-complements based on the 
preliminary results of this study include physician time and technicians, physician time and 
nurses, and APPs and LPNs. However, depending on the model, the degree of complementarity 
or substitutability has declined over time relative to the findings reported in Thurston and Libby 
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(2002). Together, the results suggest that over the past 40 years medical practices have realized 
the efficiency gains that were once readily available. 
 This study provides insight into the complex relationship between various inputs in the 
production of office visits at a time of increased stress on the health care system. My findings 
should be of particular interest to medical practices as they continue to search for strategies to 
produce to both produce more visits and reduce costs. In addition, policymakers will want to use 
this information when they weigh the costs and benefits of expanding the supply of medical 




 The data for this study come from AMGA’s 2019 Medical Group Operations and Finance 
Survey. AMGA is a trade association representing large, multispecialty medical groups. The 
operations and finance survey is a practice-level survey containing information on patient access, 
office operations, revenue and expenses, and staffing. The 2019 edition of the survey is the most 
recent and detailed edition available. These data will be supplemented with data from the 2020 
edition upon its release. 
The operations and finance survey is weighted towards the large, multispecialty medical 
groups that AMGA serves. Unlike previous studies which focus primarily on independently 
owned and operated single physician practices, the unit of analysis in this study is a practice, 
typically employing several physicians, located within a medical group.3 In most cases, there are 
multiple practices per medical group and, as mentioned, many physicians working within each 
 




practice. Although the operations and finance survey does not generalize to the universe of 
medical practices, there is a growing trend of medical practices consolidating into larger groups 
(Kirchhoff 2013). 
 Physician survey data of this kind are extremely rare (Berk 2016). In the mid-1990s, the 
Healthcare Financing Administration (HCFA) discontinued its survey of physician offices. Since 
then, neither the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS, the successor to HCFA) nor 
any other government agency has collected similar data. This is perhaps one reason why more 
recent studies rely on non-US data. It also explains why the study by Thurston and Libby was 
published in 2002 using data from the mid-1980s. AMGA is graciously providing access to their 
current data under a special agreement specifically written for this study.  
 
II.A Output Measures 
Two measures of medical practice output are used: total weekly patient office visits and 
total weekly work RVUs. The RVUs are a productivity measure used to calculate Medicare 
payments. In the mid-1980s, HCFA became concerned about growing Medicare costs and low 
reimbursement rates for primary care physicians. To help alleviate these concerns, the agency 
tasked Harvard economist William Hsiao to develop a new payment scheme. In response, Hsiao 
and his colleagues created the Resource-Based Relative Value System (RBRVS).  
The system is designed such that each medical procedure is given a code (called a 
Current Procedure Terminology or CPT code). Each code corresponds to a certain number of 
RVUs of a specific type. The three types are for work effort, practice expense, and liability 
insurance. The Medicare payment equals the total RVU multiplied by a dollar conversion factor, 
which is adjusted for geographic variations in costs. The RVUs are designed to reflect the 
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resource usage of any one service relative to the resource usage of other services. Congress did 
not authorize RBRVS until 1989 and the system was not fully phased in until 1992. Today, most 
private payers also rely on the system, and many physicians use the work RVUs to measure their 
productivity (Clemens and Gottlieb 2017; Smith 2015).4 
 
II.B Input Measures 
All three models estimated in this paper include physician time, technicians, office aids, 
and capital as inputs in the production process of office visits. Physician time is defined as the 
sum of all the hours worked per week by every physician within a given practice. This differs 
slightly from the earlier studies (Reinhardt 1972; Thurston and Libby 2002) wherein physician 
time was defined as the number of hours worked per week by the physician owner being 
surveyed. Even so, this previous definition still captured the total hours worked per week in 
practices where the physician owner was the only doctor (i.e. the vast majority of practices at the 
time). Moreover, for both definitions, a one-unit change in this input is interpreted as one 
additional hour of physician time. 
Technicians refers to radiology/imaging staff and laboratory staff, and office aids 
includes referral coordinators, medical receptionists, and office call center staff. These labor 
categories were defined this way to be as similar as possible to the earlier studies. This way, any 
changes in the results should reflect the underlying changes in the productive relationships. All 
labor inputs (including APPs and nurses) are measured as the number of full time equivalent 
(FTE) employees normalized by the number of FTE physicians working at the office. One FTE 
is equivalent to 2,080 hours of paid time per year, inclusive of vacation and holiday time. Capital 
 
4 For more information on RBRVS, see Laugesen (2014) and Smith (2015). 
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refers to the yearly rental and depreciation costs of office space and equipment. All models also 
include as controls the number of physicians per 1,000 population and an indicator for specialty.5 
The three models are differentiated by how APPs and nurses enter the production 
function. APPs refers to nurse practitioners and physician assistants. These are the most highly 
trained non-physician clinical staff. Generally, their autonomy varies according to state scope-of-
practice laws, but in most states, they have full authority to prescribe prescription drugs. 
Registered nurses (RNs) are the next most highly trained staff, followed by licensed practical 




 The goal of this study is to examine the extent to which the labor inputs of a modern 
medical practice as well as non-labor inputs may serve as compliments or substitutes in the 
production of office visits. To do so, this study follows the previous literature by estimating a 
production function for office visits. This function expresses one output as a function of one or 
more inputs. This relationship can be written without a specific functional form as: 
 𝑄𝑄  =  𝐹𝐹(𝑿𝑿)  =  𝑓𝑓[𝐻𝐻(𝑧𝑧),  𝑋𝑋2,  𝑋𝑋3, … ,  𝑋𝑋𝐾𝐾] (1) 
where, in this context, 𝑄𝑄 denotes the number of office visits produced by a medical practice, 
𝐻𝐻(𝑧𝑧) is the rate of input of doctor time in the practice, and the elements of the vector 𝑿𝑿 =
(𝑋𝑋1, … ,𝑋𝑋𝐾𝐾) are the quantities of other labor and non-labor inputs used at the practice. 
 
5 The number of physicians per 1,000 population is calculated using data from the Association of American Medical 




 The next step is to choose, from a menu of production functions, one that, for theoretical 
reasons, best describes the production process. Most of the commonly used production functions 
satisfy the following four properties: 
1. Nonnegativity: 𝐹𝐹(𝑿𝑿) is a finite, non-negative, and real-valued number. 
2. Strong Essentiality: 𝐹𝐹(𝑿𝑿) requires some of every input in the production process. 
3. Monotonicity: If 𝑿𝑿1  ≥  𝑿𝑿0 then 𝐹𝐹(𝑿𝑿𝟏𝟏)  ≥  𝐹𝐹(𝑿𝑿𝟎𝟎). In other words, additional units of an 
input will increase output. 
4. Concavity: For vectors 𝑿𝑿1 and 𝑿𝑿0, and 0 ≤  𝜃𝜃 ≤  1, 𝐹𝐹(𝜃𝜃𝑿𝑿0 + (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝑿𝑿1)  ≥
 𝜃𝜃𝐹𝐹(𝑿𝑿0) + (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝐹𝐹(𝑿𝑿1). In other words, a variety of inputs will produce no less output 
than many of one type of input. 
These properties are neither exhaustive nor universal. For example, property (2) is often replaced 
with weak essentiality, meaning 𝐹𝐹(𝑿𝑿) only requires at least one input. Property (3) is also often 
relaxed to nondecreasing, whereby additional units of an input will not decrease output. 
 To conduct my empirical analysis I use the generalized linear production function 
proposed by Diewert (1971), which is the same function selected by Thurston and Libby (2002). 
For a vector of 𝐾𝐾 inputs 𝑿𝑿 = (𝑋𝑋1, … ,𝑋𝑋𝐾𝐾), with 𝑋𝑋0 = 1, this function is defined as follows: 






where 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. If 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0 for 𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,𝐾𝐾 then this function is everywhere nondecreasing and 
satisfies every condition for a legitimate production function. Even if some 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 < 0, it may still 
be a valid production function so long as the negative coefficients are not too large. Most 
importantly, this function satisfies weak essentiality. This requirement was originally set by 
Reinhardt, as not every practice will employ every type of labor. 
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 Since the multiplication is commutative, Equation (2) can be simplified slightly: 






where 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 for 𝑖𝑖 = 𝑗𝑗 and 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖/2 otherwise. I estimate three versions of the production 
function given by Equation (3), which are differentiated by how the non-physician clinical staff 
are categorized. Formally, the three versions are: 
• Model 1: 𝐾𝐾 = 5, 𝑿𝑿 ={physician hours, nurses, technicians, office aids, and capital}. 
• Model 2: 𝐾𝐾 = 6, 𝑿𝑿 ={physician hours, APPs, nurses, technicians, office aids, and 
capital}. 
• Model 3: 𝐾𝐾 = 8, 𝑿𝑿 ={physician hours, APPs, RNs, LPNs, CNAs, technicians, office 
aids, and capital}. 
 In the first model [Model 1], APPs, RNs, LPNs, and CNAs are combined into one 
“nurse” category to allow for easy comparison with the previous literature (Reinhardt 1972; 
Thurston and Libby 2002). In the second model [Model 2], APPs are included in the production 
function by themselves, while RNs, LPNs, and CNAs are left combined as the “nurse” category. 
Finally, in the last model [Model 3], APPs, RNs, LPNs, and CNAs are included in the production 
function separately. 
 To examine q-complementarity, the Hick’s elasticity of complementarity, 𝜂𝜂𝐻𝐻, is 
calculated for each input pair following Thurston and Libby (2002). For any two inputs, 𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 (𝑖𝑖 ≠
𝑗𝑗),  the elasticity is defined as: 
 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻  =  
𝑌𝑌  ×  𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖  ×  𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖
 ∀𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗 (4) 
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where 𝑌𝑌 is the output, 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the cross-partial for inputs 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗, and 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 and 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 are the marginal 
products for inputs 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗, respectively.6 So long as the marginal products are positive (𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 > 0), 
the sign of the elasticity is determined by the sign of 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. A positive elasticity indicates the two 
inputs are complements; a negative elasticity indicates the two inputs are substitutes. 
 
IV. Results 
 Table 1.1 shows a comparison of means for the inputs. The leftmost 1965–67 column 
shows the values from Reinhardt (1972), while the middle two 1985 and 1988 columns show the 
values from Thurston and Libby (2002). The rightmost column shows the values for the 2019 
AMGA data used in my analysis. Similarly, the top half of the table displays the means for the 
inputs that are common across all three studies, while the bottom half displays the means for the 
inputs unique to my analysis. 
Table 1.1. Comparison of Means 
Variable 1965–67  1985  1988  2019 
Common Inputs        
     Physician Time 34.12  25.28  25.28  40.00a 
     Capital $464  $35,433  $55,304  $455,000b 
     RNs 0.46  0.33  0.35  0.55 
     Technicians 0.26  0.29  0.49  0.51c 
     Office Aids 1.24  1.53  1.74  0.87d 
New Inputs        
     APPs       1.03 
     LPNs       0.82 
     CNAs       1.13 
     All Nursing Staff including APPs       2.40 
     All Nursing Staff excluding APPs       1.88 
Note: a Physician time is defined as the total number of hours worked per week by every physician at the office. It 
is calculated by multiplying the number of FTE physicians working at an office by 40. b Capital values for 1965–
67, 1985, and 1988 are adjusted for inflation to 2019 dollars. c Technicians does not include pharmacy staff, 
dietician/nutritionists, behavioral health/social work staff, and other direct patient care support staff. d Office aids 
does not include quality assurance personnel. 
 
 




𝑖𝑖 = 0   =  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  
1
2
� ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖=0 �
𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖









 Starting at the top of Table 1.1 and reading from left to right, the average number of 
hours worked per week by a single physician appears to have declined from the mid-1960s to the 
mid-1980s. Other research has shown this trend continuing into the present (Rao et al. 2017; 
Staiger 2010). However, in this study, the average number of hours worked by a single physician 
is 40 by definition, since this is based on the number of FTE physicians reported at a given 
practice. To be consistent with how the previous literature (Reinhardt 1972; Thurston and Libby 
2002) measure physician time, I multiply the number of reported FTE physicians by 40 hours. 
Moving down, Table 1.1 also shows that physician offices have become more capital intensive 
over time. Likewise, if APPs, RNs, LPNs, and CNAs are added together into one category, then 
physician offices have also become more nurse intensive. The number of technicians appears to 
have remained constant, while the number of office aids increased through the 1980s before 
falling again. 
 Tables 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 report the regression results for Models 1, 2, and 3 described 
above for both office visits and work RVUs. It is difficult to interpret the regression coefficients 
directly because of the square root transformation and cross-products. As a result, the remainder 
of this section focuses on the marginal product and elasticity estimates based on these regression 
coefficients. 
Table 1.5 presents a comparison of the marginal products and Hick’s Elasticity estimates 
based on the regression coefficients from Model 1. The top panel reports estimates from 
Thurston and Libby (2002). The middle and bottom panels report estimates using the 2019 
AMGA data. The middle panel shows the results when the outcome is office visits while the 
bottom panel shows the results when the outcome is work RVUs. Standard errors are calculated 
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using the “delta method.” If two inputs are complements, then the elasticity will be greater than 
zero. Alternatively, if two inputs are substitutes, then the elasticity will be less than zero.  
Table 1.2. Regression Results from Model 1 
 
Total Visits  Total wRVUs 
Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error 
Constant 8.283  (9.840)  0.558  (16.678) 
1 × √𝐻𝐻 0.685  (1.746)  2.372  (3.552) 
1 × �𝐿𝐿1 -4.146  (8.560)  -4.262  (15.366) 
1 × �𝐿𝐿2 -1.124  (6.491)  -18.111  (17.949) 
1 × �𝐿𝐿3 4.285  (4.674)  32.887
***  (11.209) 
1 × √𝐾𝐾 -1.637  (1.202)  -3.358  (2.757) 
√𝐻𝐻 × √𝐻𝐻 0.051***  (0.009)  0.093***  (0.026) 
√𝐻𝐻 × �𝐿𝐿1 0.192  (0.722)  0.083  (1.364) 
√𝐻𝐻 × �𝐿𝐿2 0.872  (0.638)  2.313  (1.427) 
√𝐻𝐻 × �𝐿𝐿3 -1.295
*  (0.663)  -3.191**  (1.453) 
√𝐻𝐻 × √𝐾𝐾 -0.001  (0.012)  -0.002  (0.032) 
�𝐿𝐿1 × �𝐿𝐿1 -0.287  (1.242)  -0.680  (2.524) 
�𝐿𝐿1 × �𝐿𝐿2 -0.858  (1.234)  0.254  (4.202) 
�𝐿𝐿1 × �𝐿𝐿3 -2.561  (2.118)  -5.264  (4.276) 
�𝐿𝐿1 × √𝐾𝐾 0.825
*  (0.465)  1.466  (1.003) 
�𝐿𝐿2 × �𝐿𝐿2 2.334  (1.652)  4.609  (5.055) 
�𝐿𝐿2 × �𝐿𝐿3 -1.708  (2.086)  -5.264  (6.789) 
�𝐿𝐿2 × √𝐾𝐾 -0.448  (0.292)  -0.200  (0.548) 
�𝐿𝐿3 × �𝐿𝐿3 1.728  (1.599)  -0.962  (3.515) 
�𝐿𝐿3 × √𝐾𝐾 0.669  (0.399)  0.453  (0.836) 
√𝐾𝐾 × √𝐾𝐾 -0.005*  (0.003)  -0.001  (0.006) 
𝑁𝑁 870  853 
Note: Inputs are defined as 𝐻𝐻: physician time; 𝐿𝐿1: nurses; 𝐿𝐿2: technicians; 𝐿𝐿3: office aids; and 𝐾𝐾: capital. Nurses 
includes APPs, RNs, LPNs, and CNAs. Standard errors are heteroskedastic robust and clustered at the office level. 





Table 1.3. Regression Results from Model 2 
 
Total Visits  Total wRVUs 
Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error 
Constant 19.951**  (8.234)  28.186*  (14.191) 
1 × √𝐻𝐻 0.842  (1.569)  2.573  (3.273) 
1 × �𝐿𝐿1 -16.504
**  (7.493)  -42.540**  (18.041) 
1 × �𝐿𝐿2 -0.505  (7.790)  8.782  (14.800) 
1 × �𝐿𝐿3 -2.097  (7.802)  -22.678  (19.870) 
1 × �𝐿𝐿4 5.165  (6.173)  25.381
**  (11.119) 
1 × √𝐾𝐾 -2.289  (1.386)  -4.735  (3.131) 
√𝐻𝐻 × √𝐻𝐻 0.042***  (0.012)  0.070**  (0.028) 
√𝐻𝐻 × �𝐿𝐿1 1.684
**  (0.787)  3.558**  (1.625) 
√𝐻𝐻 × �𝐿𝐿2 -0.685  (1.055)  -1.849  (1.892) 
√𝐻𝐻 × �𝐿𝐿3 0.813  (0.613)  2.353  (1.491) 
√𝐻𝐻 × �𝐿𝐿4 -1.085
**  (0.484)  -2.459**  (1.085) 
√𝐻𝐻 × √𝐾𝐾 0.010  (0.014)  0.025  (0.032) 
�𝐿𝐿1 × �𝐿𝐿1 4.226
*  (2.232)  9.433*  (5.166) 
�𝐿𝐿1 × �𝐿𝐿2 1.785  (2.455)  5.392  (5.017) 
�𝐿𝐿1 × �𝐿𝐿3 1.570  (1.657)  2.651  (3.857) 
�𝐿𝐿1 × �𝐿𝐿4 0.073  (1.645)  -1.277  (3.461) 
�𝐿𝐿1 × √𝐾𝐾 -0.292  (0.386)  0.007  (0.835) 
�𝐿𝐿2 × �𝐿𝐿2 -3.395  (2.342)  -9.032  (6.113) 
�𝐿𝐿2 × �𝐿𝐿3 -1.232  (1.750)  0.475  (4.748) 
�𝐿𝐿2 × �𝐿𝐿4 -2.564  (3.194)  -3.093  (3.968) 
�𝐿𝐿2 × √𝐾𝐾 1.523
*  (0.839)  2.581  (1.784) 
�𝐿𝐿3 × �𝐿𝐿3 4.675
*  (2.300)  11.580  (7.645) 
�𝐿𝐿3 × �𝐿𝐿4 -1.994  (2.333)  -6.173  (7.517) 
�𝐿𝐿3 × √𝐾𝐾 -0.617
*  (0.336)  -0.680  (0.693) 
�𝐿𝐿4 × �𝐿𝐿4 0.161  (1.701)  -0.790  (3.429) 
�𝐿𝐿4 × √𝐾𝐾 0.609
*  (0.317)  0.240  (0.677) 
√𝐾𝐾 × √𝐾𝐾 -0.007**  (0.003)  -0.005  (0.007) 
𝑁𝑁 808  791 
Note: Inputs are defined as 𝐻𝐻: physician time; 𝐿𝐿1: APPs; 𝐿𝐿2: nurses; 𝐿𝐿3: technicians; 𝐿𝐿4: office aids; and 𝐾𝐾: capital. 
Nurses includes RNs, LPNs, and CNAs. Standard errors are heteroskedastic robust and clustered at the office level. 





Table 1.4. Regression Results from Model 3 
 
Total Visits  Total wRVUs 
Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error 
Constant 14.453*  (7.169)  11.112  (15.206) 
1 × √𝐻𝐻 0.994  (1.423)  2.779  (2.903) 
1 × �𝐿𝐿1 -17.862
**  (6.750)  -43.342***  (15.092) 
1 × �𝐿𝐿2 3.183  (3.162)  2.425  (10.408) 
1 × �𝐿𝐿3 1.681  (6.354)  16.874  (12.590) 
1 × �𝐿𝐿4 -5.128  (4.930)  -1.282  (11.023) 
1 × �𝐿𝐿5 -2.745  (6.952)  -22.433  (19.324) 
1 × �𝐿𝐿6 4.124  (5.156)  17.133
*  (8.826) 
1 × √𝐾𝐾 -2.285*  (1.232)  -4.818*  (2.701) 
√𝐻𝐻 × √𝐻𝐻 0.041***  (0.010)  0.069***  (0.023) 
√𝐻𝐻 × �𝐿𝐿1 1.689
**  (0.769)  3.658**  (1.543) 
√𝐻𝐻 × �𝐿𝐿2 -0.082  (0.422)  1.014  (1.279) 
√𝐻𝐻 × �𝐿𝐿3 -0.090  (0.640)  -1.719  (1.491) 
√𝐻𝐻 × �𝐿𝐿4 -1.420  (1.193)  -3.889  (3.049) 
√𝐻𝐻 × �𝐿𝐿5 0.517  (0.558)  1.571  (1.513) 
√𝐻𝐻 × �𝐿𝐿6 -0.725
*  (0.402)  -0.928  (1.058) 
√𝐻𝐻 × √𝐾𝐾 0.014  (0.013)  0.030  (0.026) 
�𝐿𝐿1 × �𝐿𝐿1 3.996
*  (2.293)  8.924*  (4.748) 
�𝐿𝐿1 × �𝐿𝐿2 2.866  (2.416)  6.956
*  (3.526) 
�𝐿𝐿1 × �𝐿𝐿3 3.043
*  (1.517)  4.594  (3.701) 
�𝐿𝐿1 × �𝐿𝐿4 -1.439  (1.732)  -2.759  (3.941) 
�𝐿𝐿1 × �𝐿𝐿5 0.812  (1.545)  0.440  (3.050) 
�𝐿𝐿1 × �𝐿𝐿6 -0.511  (1.334)  -1.835  (2.867) 
�𝐿𝐿1 × √𝐾𝐾 -0.155  (0.370)  0.184  (0.788) 
�𝐿𝐿2 × �𝐿𝐿2 -0.579  (1.725)  -0.242  (4.804) 
�𝐿𝐿2 × �𝐿𝐿3 -2.566
**  (1.063)  -4.714  (2.965) 
�𝐿𝐿2 × �𝐿𝐿4 -1.407  (2.270)  -4.158  (5.187) 
�𝐿𝐿2 × �𝐿𝐿5 -0.023  (1.476)  6.444  (6.207) 
�𝐿𝐿2 × �𝐿𝐿6 -1.695  (2.019)  -2.513  (2.960) 
�𝐿𝐿2 × √𝐾𝐾 0.089  (0.243)  -0.747  (0.641) 
�𝐿𝐿3 × �𝐿𝐿3 -2.474  (1.730)  -9.073
**  (4.196) 
�𝐿𝐿3 × �𝐿𝐿4 -4.121  (2.518)  -7.362  (7.152) 
�𝐿𝐿3 × �𝐿𝐿5 0.036  (1.908)  -1.769  (5.440) 
�𝐿𝐿3 × �𝐿𝐿6 -2.158  (2.157)  -3.912  (3.302) 
�𝐿𝐿3 × √𝐾𝐾 0.696  (0.473)  1.941  (1.317) 
�𝐿𝐿4 × �𝐿𝐿4 -0.530  (1.588)  -2.581  (3.625) 




 Total Visits  Total wRVUs 
 Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error 
�𝐿𝐿4 × �𝐿𝐿5 -3.428
*  (1.962)  -7.811  (7.390) 
�𝐿𝐿4 × �𝐿𝐿6 -1.052  (2.343)  1.020  (4.820) 
�𝐿𝐿4 × √𝐾𝐾 2.051
**  (0.952)  4.137  (2.481) 
�𝐿𝐿5 × �𝐿𝐿5 5.451
***  (1.834)  13.274*  (7.282) 
�𝐿𝐿5 × �𝐿𝐿6 2.676  (2.646)  5.417  (3.392) 
�𝐿𝐿5 × √𝐾𝐾 -0.588
*  (0.334)  -0.462  (0.663) 
�𝐿𝐿6 × �𝐿𝐿6 1.021  (1.499)  2.199  (3.417) 
�𝐿𝐿6 × √𝐾𝐾 0.322  (0.271)  -0.813  (0.633) 
√𝐾𝐾 × √𝐾𝐾 -0.010**  (0.004)  -0.009  (0.006) 
𝑁𝑁 808  791 
Note: Inputs are defined as 𝐻𝐻: physician time; 𝐿𝐿1: APPs; 𝐿𝐿2: RNs; 𝐿𝐿3: LPNs; 𝐿𝐿4: CNAs; 𝐿𝐿5: technicians; 𝐿𝐿6: office 
aids; and 𝐾𝐾: capital. Standard errors are heteroskedastic robust and clustered at the office level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
In the 1980s, one additional hour of physician time was associated with more than one 
additional office visit per week. Now, a physician hour is associated with less than a tenth of a 
visit. While it may be the case that physicians have become less productive over time, the 
smaller marginal product for physician time may also be a mechanical result of large offices 
employing multiple physicians. That is, suppose that an office employs ten physicians, meaning 
a one unit increase in physician time would be measured as a change from 400 to 401 hours. 
Perhaps this change is simply less meaningful than a change from 40 to 41 hours, which would 
be the more common case in the older data when offices were more likely to be owned and 





Table 1.5. Elasticity Estimates for Model 1 
  1985, 1988 Samples—Total Visits 
Marginal  
Productivity 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 
Physician Time  Nurses  Technicians  Office Aids  Capital 











 Nurses 1.97*** 
(0.76) 





      
















  2019 Sample—Total Visits 
Marginal  
Productivity 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 
Physician Time  Nurses  Technicians  Office Aids  Capital 











 Nurses 0.12 
(0.28) 





      
















  2019 Sample—Total wRVUs 
Marginal  
Productivity 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 
Physician Time  Nurses  Technicians  Office Aids  Capital 











 Nurses 0.03 
(0.45) 





      
















Note: Hick’s elasticities of complementarity, 𝜂𝜂𝐻𝐻, are calculated at the means of the data. Standard errors are 
calculated by the “delta method” and are in parentheses. For 𝜂𝜂𝐻𝐻 > 0, the inputs are complements, and, for 𝜂𝜂𝐻𝐻 < 0, 
the inputs are substitutes. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
A comparison of the top and middle panels in Table 1.5 shows that the marginal products 
for nurses and technicians have also declined, although at 4.15 and 4.75, respectively, these 
estimates are still reasonable. However, hiring one more office aid is now associated with a loss 
of four visits per week. If we look down at the elasticity estimates, we can see that the estimate 
for office aids and capital is large and negative (𝜂𝜂𝐻𝐻 = -6.39). It could be that the negative 
marginal product for office aids and the large negative elasticity between them and capital reflect 
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an increasing administrative burden. For example, increased use of health IT systems which may 
not communicate well with each other and which may be cumbersome to use could be reducing 
the contribution of office aids towards total physician output. Another possibility is that office 
aids are expending large amounts of time and energy obtaining prior authorization from 
insurance companies and, should reimbursement be denied after a treatment has been performed, 
pursuing bad denials. 
 For most other input pairs, the sign of the elasticity has remained unchanged, meaning 
complements remain complements and substitutes remain substitutes for the most part. For 
example, Thurston and Libby (2002) find strong q-complementarity between physician time and 
nurses (𝜂𝜂𝐻𝐻 = 1.97, p<0.01). In the 2019 data for office visits, this elasticity is much smaller and 
not statistically significant (𝜂𝜂𝐻𝐻 = 0.12). The one exception to this trend of smaller elasticities is 
for physician time and technicians, which is large and significant (𝜂𝜂𝐻𝐻 = 1.55, p<0.05), implying 
the two inputs are strong complements. This could be due to more tests being available today 
than in the 1980s or physicians practicing medicine more defensively to forestall medical 
malpractice lawsuits. Looking at the results that use the 2019 data for work RVUs (the bottom 
panel), the marginal products and elasticities exhibit the same pattern as the results produced 
using office visits. 
One interpretation of these results is that since the mid-1980s, medical practices may 
have already adjusted the size and skill mix of their clinical workforce and made other changes 
to achieve the efficiency gains that were once readily available to them. The marginal products 
are therefore lower and the elasticities between some inputs are smaller. These changes may 
have been driven by the rise of managed care and its use of capitated payments. Note that many 
of the 2019 elasticity estimates are not statistically significant. Incorporating more data from 
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AMGA in the near future should improve the precision of these estimates and produce more 
statistically significant results. 
Table 1.6 presents the results for Model 2 where APPs and nurses enter the production 
function as separate categories. The top panel of Table 1.6 presents the results for when output is 
measured as total visits and the bottom panel presents the results when output is measured as 
total work RVUs. Here, the results show nurses provide practices with more marginal visits than 
APPs (15.02 vs. 7.52) but contribute fewer work RVUs than APPs (22.45 vs. 27.8). This may 
reflect the fact that APPs have their own fee schedule under the RBRVS and directly contribute 
to their office’s total RVU count, whereas nurses operate in a purely supporting role.  
Interestingly, the marginal products for technicians and office aids have changed sign in 
the results for total visits. Employing one more technician is now associated with 11 fewer 
patient visits per week but hiring an additional office aid is associated with an increase of four 
visits per week. These changes in sign are likely a reflection of the nature of APP work. 
Depending on state scope-of-practice laws, APPs may be performing a great deal of work in the 
office but are unable to order tests and scans—only the physician can do that. Similarly, the tasks 
carried out by APPs may be less subject to change than treatments rendered by physicians, and 





Table 1.6. Elasticity Estimates for Model 2 









































      





























































      




















Note: Hick’s elasticities of complementarity, 𝜂𝜂𝐻𝐻, are calculated at the means of the data. Standard errors are 
calculated by the “delta method” and are in parentheses. For 𝜂𝜂𝐻𝐻 > 0, the inputs are complements, and, for 𝜂𝜂𝐻𝐻 < 0, 





Table 1.7. Elasticity Estimates for Model 3 
 Total Visits 
Marginal Productivity 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖  
Physician Time APPs RNs LPNs CNAs Technicians Office Aids Capital 
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Physician Time APPs RNs LPNs CNAs Technicians Office Aids Capital 














































   




























Note: Hick’s elasticities of complementarity, 𝜂𝜂𝐻𝐻, are calculated at the means of the data. Standard errors are calculated by the “delta method” and are in parentheses. For 𝜂𝜂𝐻𝐻 > 0, 
the inputs are complements, and, for 𝜂𝜂𝐻𝐻 < 0, the inputs are substitutes. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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The elasticity estimates in Table 1.6 are generally small and insignificant, which is 
consistent with the estimates shown in the previous table. Once again, it should be noted that the 
addition of more data could adjust these estimates and tighten the standard errors, thereby 
producing more statistically significant results. Currently, though, the elasticity for physician 
time and APPs is positive and significant (𝜂𝜂𝐻𝐻= 0.97, p<0.01), which suggests these inputs are 
strong complements and work well together. This is also likely caused by state scope-of-practice 
laws, as physicians must be in a supervisory role with their APPs, although the degree of 
supervision can vary by state. 
Table 1.7 presents the results for Model 3 where nurses are further subdivided into RNs, 
LPNs, and CNAs. The panels in this table are organized the same way as in Table 1.6. Here, 
APPs and LPNs exhibit roughly equal marginal products (8.92 and 9.93, respectively, for total 
visits), while RNs show the smallest marginal product (0.34 for total visits) and CNAs show the 
largest (19.81 for total visits). At first glance, these results may seem surprising, as CNAs are the 
least skilled nurses. However, CNAs are the nurses who will take a patient’s temperature, 
weight, and blood pressure upon entering the office. The marginal product for CNAs is likely 
higher than the rest because they will do this for every patient, regardless of any patient’s 
particular illness. As for the other nursing occupations, one possibility is that the tasks that have 
traditionally fallen to RNs have shifted to APPs and LPNs.  
The elasticity estimates are consistent with the interpretation that APPs and LPNs may be 
taking on more work previously done by RNs. If we look at the results for total visits, we can see 
that the elasticity for physician time and APPs is still positive and significant (𝜂𝜂𝐻𝐻 = 0.67, 
p<0.01). However, the elasticity for APPs and LPNs is also positive and significant (𝜂𝜂𝐻𝐻 = 0.17, 
p<0.05), which suggests the two inputs are strong complements that work well together and are 
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productivity enhancing. As is the case in the earlier tables, the marginal products and elasticities 
for work RVUs show the same pattern as the results for total visits. 
 
V. Discussion 
This paper investigates the productive relationships between different labor and non-labor 
inputs in the production process for office visits using unique, proprietary data on medical 
practices from 2019. Given the increased stress placed on the health care system by the influx of 
patients insured under the Affordable Care Act and the aging population, it is important to 
understand how each input contributes to the production of office visits and whether 
opportunities exist to better optimize across inputs. 
In the model where more and less highly trained nurse staff enter the production function 
as one group, my preliminary results suggest the contribution of each input may have diminished 
to some degree since the mid-1980s. For example, one additional hour of physician time, one 
additional nurse, and one additional technician are all associated with fewer additional office 
visits than they were 40 years ago. Similarly, more office aids are associated with fewer office 
visits. Models that have each nurse type enter the production function separately show a wide 
range of nurse contributions to the production process, whether output is measured by office 
visits or work RVUs. In these models, more technicians are associated fewer visits but more 
work RVUs, while more office aids are associated with more visits but a fewer number of RVUs. 
The elasticity estimates also hint at changing workplace dynamics. Here, the preliminary 
results suggest complementarity between physician time and technicians, between physician time 
and APPs, and between APPs and LPNs. In many cases, however, the degree of complementarity 
or substitutability between inputs appears to have lessened over time as many of the 2019 
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elasticity estimates are close to zero. One possible explanation for these results is that, in 
response to the rise of managed care and capitated payments, medical practices have grown more 
efficient over the past four decades.  
The results presented here have an immediate, practical application in the discussions 
surrounding health care capacity and workforce shortages. Namely, we can imagine a 
hypothetical medical practice that must meet its obligation to patients, but which operates in an 
environment where there are worker shortages. If the practice were to lose a worker of some 
kind, we could trace out different alternative input combinations that would maintain the same 
level of output as before the worker left. The following scenario is an illustrative example based 
on the preliminary results. 
Suppose the hypothetical practice has quantities of inputs that correspond to the sample 
averages. Since there are many health policy professionals forecasting a shortage of physicians, 
let’s imagine the number of physician hours at the practice is cut in half from 333 to 166. To 
maintain production of the same number of office visits, the practice could increase the number 
of APPs from about one to about three or increase the number of CNAs from around one to 
around six. If the practice were to substitute with capital, annual spending on capital would need 
to increase by 34 percent (from about $450K to about $600K). If the number of physician hours 
were to fall by 40 (representing the loss of one FTE physician), the practice could hold output 
constant by increasing the number of CNAs from one to four. 
The exercise above illustrates how the results of this sort of analysis can be applied. 
While this analysis is based on my preliminary results, the final version of this study will likely 
differ in at least three important ways. First, the inclusion of more data should roughly double the 
existing sample and may modify the current estimates and standard errors, improving precision. 
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Second, the AMGA data also contain worker salaries. Incorporating this information will allow 
for a full-blown cost-benefit analysis, which will also show which input combinations can 
maintain the same patient volume and be profitable to employ. Finally, the AMGA data contain 
counts of other FTE employees that will be added to the analysis. Specifically, the technician 
category might be expanded into a broader “clinical support staff” category that also consists of 
pharmacy staff, nutritionists, and behavioral health staff. Likewise, the office aids category might 
be expanded to include quality assurance personnel. Finally, counts of FTE administrative staff 
will also be added to the analysis to investigate the productive capacity of administrators. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 Using unique, proprietary data from 2019, this study estimates a production function for 
office visits in order to examine the complementarity and substitutability of various labor and 
non-labor inputs in the production process. The inputs considered include physician time, the 
number of FTE workers of different types, and capital, which is measured as the rental and 
depreciation costs of office space and equipment. Production function regression coefficients are 
used to calculate Hick’s Elasticities for different pairs of inputs, which show which combinations 
are q-complements (and therefore efficiency enhancing) and which are q-substitutes (and 
therefore not efficiency enhancing). 
 Preliminary results suggest that the marginal productivity of some inputs is smaller than 
their marginal productivity from several decades ago (Reinhardt 1972; Thurston and Libby 
2002). While many elasticity estimates match in terms of their historical classification as 
compliments or substitutes, their magnitudes have also fallen over time. One possible 
interpretation of these results is that medical practices have already adapted to changes in the 
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economic, regulatory, and technological environment in which they practice and have achieved 
the easy efficiency gains that were once available to them. 
 Today, the health care system must respond to the sharp increase in the demand for 
medical care brought on by the influx of newly insured patients under the Affordable Care Act 
and the aging population. As policymakers contemplate how to increase health care capacity, 
they should take a holistic view and consider options that encompass the entire production 
process for medical care. This way, they can help make sure the health care sector is maximizing 












The 2010 Affordable Care Act (ACA) was designed to enact universal insurance 
coverage by reforming the non-group insurance market, mandating that all individuals purchase 
insurance, and helping low-income individuals comply with the mandate by expanding Medicaid 
and providing subsidies. To help cover the cost of the Medicaid expansion and the subsidies, the 
law also included a provision whereby payments to safety-net hospitals—those that traditionally 
served many low-income and uninsured individuals—would be gradually phased out (MACPAC 
2016).  
These reductions were originally set to begin in fiscal year (FY) 2014. Several pieces of 
legislation since 2010, however, have delayed the payment cuts. As of this writing, the first 
federal reduction, totaling $4 billion, will occur in FY 2021 with further reductions of $8 billion 
occurring every year from 2022 through 2025 (MACPAC 2020a; MACPAC 2020b). In 2017, the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) began soliciting feedback on its proposed 
method for implementing the reductions, and on September 25, 2019, the agency issued its final 
ruling (CMS 2019). 
In theory, these payments would no longer be necessary because every patient would 
have insurance. In 2012, however, the Supreme Court ruled that the Medicaid expansion would 
be optional, and since then not every state has decided to move forward with the expansion 
(Musumeci 2012; KFF 2019). As a result, some hospitals may find themselves in a situation 
whereby they lose their supplemental payments without a corresponding increase in their number 
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of insured patients. Even hospitals in expansion states may find themselves on uncertain 
financial footing if the reductions in supplemental payments exceed the revenue they receive 
from newly insured patients. 
To provide some insight into the future of these safety-net hospitals, this paper revisits 
the 2006 Massachusetts reform, which had many similar features to the ACA. Studies which 
examined safety-net hospitals in the immediate aftermath of the reform found that those hospitals 
suffered financially compared to their non-safety-net counterparts (Mohan et al. 2013; Bazzoli 
and Clement 2014). Those safety-net hospitals, however, still exist today.  
This study therefore uses hospital cost report data to investigate the long-term impact of 
the reform on the financial health of the safety-net hospitals. It also tests the sensitivity of 
previously established results to different safety-net definitions. The results presented here are 
generally larger in magnitude and more highly significant than previous results in the literature 
which are based on a shorter time frame. In addition, if less stringent federal definitions of 
safety-net hospitals are used, then the results are positive, indicating the reform benefited those 
hospitals. If a stricter definition is used, however, then the results turn negative. This implies 
hospitals that provided the most care to the uninsured were indeed hurt by the reform. 
 
II. Background 
The 2006 Massachusetts reform sought to achieve universal insurance coverage in the 
state using many of the same mechanisms as the ACA. In fact, the Massachusetts reform and the 
ACA share the same chief architect—MIT economist Jonathan Gruber—and the state reform 
served as a model for the national law. In particular, the state reform expanded MassHealth, the 
state’s Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance Program, to cover families with incomes up to 
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300 percent of the federal poverty line. In 2011, this amounted to a subsidy of $32,670 for an 
individual and $67,050 for a family of four (KFF 2012). The state law also established the 
Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector as the health insurance exchange website wherein 
residents could purchase both subsidized and non-subsidized private health insurance. After the 
first year of the reform, the state uninsured rate fell by almost half, dropping from 10.9 percent to 
5.5 percent according to data from the Current Population Survey (KFF 2012). 
The state law also restructured the way safety-net hospitals received supplemental 
payments. Prior to the reform, the Massachusetts Division of Healthcare Finance and Policy 
(DHCFP) issued block grants to safety-net hospitals based on each hospital’s reported charges 
from the previous year. These block grants were sourced from the state’s Uncompensated Care 
Pool (UCP), which itself was funded by general tax revenues and other sources from the state. 
After the reform, the DHCFP switched to making payments based on hospital claims that were 
adjudicated under Medicare reimbursement principles. In addition, funding switched to an 
assessment on acute hospitals’ private sector charges and a surcharge on payments made to 
hospitals by various payers, among other sources (Office of Medicaid 2012). These changes 
resulted in a decrease in the total funds available for supplemental payments from $620 million 
in 2007 under the UCP to $373 million in 2008 under the HSN (DHCFP 2007; 2008). By design, 
these funds were diverted to help finance the MassHealth expansion and the subsidies on the 
Connector (Sullivan 2009). 
Several studies examined the impact of the Massachusetts reform on the financial 
wellbeing of safety-net hospitals in the immediate aftermath of the reform. The first of these 
studies, Ku et al. (2011), define safety-net hospitals as those that received 20 percent or more of 
their net patient service revenue from Medicaid, Commonwealth Care, or HSN in 2009. These 
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criteria identify 17 hospitals as safety net. The authors examine changes in inpatient discharges 
and ambulatory care visits. They find that between 2006 and 2009, inpatient discharges at both 
safety-net and non-safety-net hospitals grew by roughly 2 percent, but that nonemergency 
ambulatory care visits from outpatient departments rose by 9.2 percent at safety-net hospitals 
compared to 4.1 percent at non-safety-net hospitals.  
Mohan et al. (2013) use a difference-in-differences study design to compare changes in 
different financial performance measures at safety-net hospitals before and after the reform to 
changes in the same measures at non-safety-net hospitals before and after the reform. The result 
is a causal estimate of how the reform impacted the financial health of safety-net hospitals. Here, 
the authors use very restrictive criteria which classify just seven hospitals as safety net. Mohan et 
al. (2013) examine changes in the number of inpatient discharges, number of outpatient visits, 
net inpatient and outpatient service revenue, net inpatient service revenue per discharge, net 
outpatient service revenue per outpatient visit, and operating margin. They find that between 
2006 and 2009, safety-net hospitals continued to serve many disadvantaged patients but saw their 
financial situation decline. In fact, the authors show that the reform resulted in a statistically 
significant decrease in net inpatient service revenue and net outpatient service revenue, and that 
by the end of their study period safety-net hospitals had a negative operating margin. 
Lastly, Bazzoli and Clement (2014) conduct a descriptive analysis on a sample of 
hospitals which spans 2004 to 2010. The authors use the same safety-net definition as the state 
health agency. Namely, hospitals qualify as safety-net if the sum of their patient charges for 
Medicare, Medicaid, other government payers, and free care meets or exceeds 63 percent of total 
charges. This definition classifies 16 or 17 hospitals as safety-net in each year of their sample. 
Bazzoli and Clement (2014) show that the operating margin of the state’s two largest safety-net 
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hospitals fell after the reform. When these two hospitals are removed from the sample, however, 
operating margins improved for both hospital types. 
 
III. Data 
This study uses data from two sets of hospital cost reports, one submitted to the state of 
Massachusetts and the other to CMS. The state data come from the 403-Hospital Cost Reports, 
which were originally filed with the DHCFP. In 2012, Massachusetts passed legislation that 
dissolved the DHCFP, created the Center for Health Information and Analysis in its place, and 
transferred administration of the HSN to the Office of Medicaid within the Executive Office of 
Health and Human Services (Office of Medicaid 2012). These changes in administration aside, 
the 403 reports were collected for FY 2001 through FY 2018. This 17-year long panel dataset 
contains five years of data before the transition period (July 2006 through January 2008) and ten 
years of data after the transition period. This ensures that pre-reform trends can be analyzed, and 
that the long-term effects of the reform can be traced out. Figure 2.1 shows a timeline of the 
reform as it pertains to the collected data. 
Figure 2.1. Timeline of the 2006 Massachusetts Reform 
 
The state cost reports contain information on basic hospital characteristics, gross patient 
service revenue by payer, net inpatient and net outpatient service revenue, number of inpatient 
discharges by payer, number of outpatient visits by payer, number of emergency room visits, and 
total costs. Hospitals were not required to report revenue or utilization rates from UCP until 
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2008, at which point HSN replaced the UCP as the source of funds for supplemental payments. 
Similarly, hospitals did not report revenue or utilization rates from Commonwealth Care until its 
creation in 2007. The data collected from the state 403 reports are supplemented with additional 
data from the Hospital Financial Statements, which contain state-audited profit information. The 
financial statements were collected for FY 2003 through FY 2017. They contain each hospital’s 
operating margin. 
The national data come from the Medicare Cost Reports (MCRs), which are annual cost 
reports submitted to CMS by every Medicare-certified institutional provider. As a result, every 
hospital that filed a 403 report with Massachusetts also filed an MCR with CMS. The MCRs are 
maintained in the Healthcare Cost Reporting Information System and contain similar information 
to the 403 reports, notwithstanding with a few key differences. Operating margin, which was 
reported directly in the financial statements, is calculated as ((total operating revenue – total 
operating costs)/total operating revenue) × 100. In the MCRs, net patient revenue is the sum of 
net inpatient and net outpatient service revenue. Finally, unlike in the 403 reports, total costs 
includes capital expense, and total inpatient discharges includes deaths.7 National MCR data 
were collected for FY 2001 through FY 2018.  
 
IV. Methods 
To examine the impact of the 2006 Massachusetts reform on safety-net hospitals, this 
study begins with a difference-in-differences model, specified as follows: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛽𝛽0  + 𝛽𝛽1(𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 × 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖)  +  𝛽𝛽2(𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖)  + 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖  + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (1) 
 
7 Net outpatient service revenue, outpatient visits, and emergency room visits are not separately reported in the MCR 
data. Outpatient visits and emergency room visits may be calculated by combining MCR data with data from the 
Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment System (OPPS). However, OPPS data are restricted, and the public use 
files are only available from 2011–2018. 
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where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an outcome measure for hospital 𝑖𝑖 at time 𝑇𝑇; 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 is an indicator equal to one if 
hospital 𝑖𝑖 is classified as safety net; 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 is an indicator equal to one if period 𝑇𝑇 is in the 
transition period of 2006 to 2008; 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 is an indicator equal to one if period 𝑇𝑇 is in the post-
reform year of 2009 or later; (𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 × 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖) is an interaction between 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 and 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖; (𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖) is an interaction between 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 and 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖; 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 is a time fixed 
effect; 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 is a hospital fixed effect; and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the error term. The terms 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 and 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 
are not separately included because they would be collinear with the time fixed effects, while 
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 is not separately included since it would be collinear with the hospital fixed effects. In this 
specification, 𝛽𝛽1 captures the effect of the transition period and 𝛽𝛽2 captures the effect of the post-
reform period. 
The validity of the difference-in-differences model rests on the assumption that the trends 
in utilization and financial performance at safety-net hospitals would have been the same as 
those at non-safety-net hospitals in the absence of the reform. Although this assumption can 
never be directly tested because the true counterfactual is never known, its likelihood can be 
tested by including a set of interaction terms between safety-net status and each year. Therefore, 
the model is amended to take the form: 
 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  � 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖
 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖  + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (2) 
where 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an indicator variable for whether treatment gets switched on in year 𝑇𝑇; 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 are year 
fixed effects; and 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 are hospital fixed effects. Here, FY 2005 is excluded to serve as reference. If 
the trends in utilization and financial performance in the safety-net and non-safety-net hospitals 
are the same in the pre-reform period, then the interaction terms for those years should be 
statistically insignificant. An added benefit of this event study model is that the interactions in 
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the post-reform period show whether the treatment effect dissipates, stays constant, or even 
increases over time. 
States have broad flexibility in determining which hospitals qualify as safety net and in 
calculating the supplemental payments they receive. However, payments must be made to 
hospitals that meet the minimum criteria stipulated in Section 1923(b) of the Social Security Act. 
If states wish to broaden these criteria to include more hospitals, they may, and as a result, some 
states make supplemental payments to a relatively small number of hospitals—those that meet 
the minimum requirements—while others make payments to a much higher percentage of 
hospitals. Because of the wide variation in which hospitals are counted as safety-net, this study 
uses three different definitions. Formally, the three definitions are: 
• Definition 1 (Restrictive): Hospitals which have a high rate of Medicaid utilization (> 
one standard deviation above the mean) and a low rate of commercial insurance 
utilization (> one standard deviation below the mean). This is the same definition 
used by Mohan et al. (2013), which classifies just seven hospitals as safety net. 
• Definition 2 (CMS): Hospitals must either have (1) a Medicaid utilization rate that is 
at least one standard deviation above the mean for hospitals in the state that receive 
Medicaid payments or (2) have a low-income utilization inpatient utilization rate that 
is greater than 25 percent. These hospitals are required to receive supplemental 
payments. 
• Definition 3 (Self-Reporting): These are the hospitals which self-report in the MCRs 
receiving supplemental payments. 
Figure 2.2 gives a breakdown of the proportion of safety-net hospitals under each 
definition. As Figure 2.2 shows, when the criteria for identifying safety-net hospitals are 
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broadened, this proportion increases. The first two definitions are applied to data from the state 
403 cost reports in 2006. 




Figure 2.3 displays trends in hospital operating margin. The graph in the top left corner 
shows the trends in operating margin for the state’s largest two safety-net hospitals, Boston 
Medical Center and Cambridge Health Alliance. The graph in the top right corner shows the 
trends in operating margin for safety-net and non-safety-net hospitals using the restrictive 
definition. The remaining two graphs in the bottom left and right corners show operating margin 
trends for CMS-defined and self-reporting safety-net hospitals, respectively. 
Boston Medical Center and Cambridge Health Alliance show a declining operating 
margin around 2008, which marks the end of the reform transition period. Although both 
hospitals slowly recovered, Cambridge Health Alliance operated at a loss in every year of the 
data. Regardless of the safety-net definition used, trends in operating margin appear to decline 
for both safety-net and non-safety-net hospitals at the end of the reform transition period. 
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Similarly, hospitals that fall under the restrictive definition had a consistently lower operating 
margin than their non-safety-net peers. However, CMS-defined and self-reporting safety-net 
hospitals had a higher average operating margin in most years of the data. 
Figure 2.3. Operating Margin Trend Graphs 
 Note: 
Vertical lines denote reform transition period. 
Figure 2.4 shows trends in the percentage of gross patient service revenue (GPSR) by 
payer. The individual payer types are grouped together as either state, federal, or commercial and 
other. Specifically, state = Medicaid + Commonwealth Care + HSN; federal = Medicare + other 
government; and commercial and other = managed care + non-managed care + self-pay + other. 
The top graphs show tends for the restrictive definition, the middle graphs show trends for the 
CMS definition, and the bottom graphs show trends for the hospitals that self-report receiving 
supplemental payments. Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show trends in the percentage of inpatient 
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discharges and outpatient visits by payer, respectively, and are read in the same way as Figure 
2.4.  
Hospitals classified as safety net under the restrictive and CMS definitions experienced, 
on average, a steep decline in GPSR from commercial payers during the reform transition period. 
At the same time, these hospitals also saw a sharp increase in revenue from state sources. The 
average changes in GPSR for self-reporting hospitals follow the same pattern, although the 
adjustments are more gradual. Similarly, this pattern is also present in the utilization trend 
graphs. The one notable difference is the high proportion of inpatient discharges from federal 





Figure 2.4. Percent of GPSR by Payer Trend Graphs 
 Note: 
Vertical lines denote reform transition period. 
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Figure 2.5. Percent of Inpatient Discharges by Payer Trend Graphs 
 Note: 
Vertical lines denote reform transition period. 
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Figure 2.6. Percent of Outpatient Visits by Payer Trend Graphs 
 
Note: Vertical lines denote reform transition period.   
45 
 
V.A Difference-in-Differences Results 
Table 2.1 displays the results from estimating Equation (1) on the financial performance 
measures. Reading from left to right, column (1) shows the results for operating margin, columns 
(2) through (4) show the results for GPSR, net inpatient service revenue, and net outpatient 
service revenue, and column (5) shows the results for total costs. All three revenue measures and 
total costs are adjusted for inflation and expressed in dollars per million. Panels A, B, and C 
separate the results by the safety-net definition used, wherein Panel A shows the results for the 
restrictive definition, Panel B shows the results for the CMS definition, and Panel C shows the 
results for the self-reporting hospitals. 
Starting with Panel A, the reform transition period is not associated with any statistically 
significant change in financial performance. However, the post-reform period is associated with 
statistically significant declines in GPSR (coef: -125.1, p<0.01), net inpatient service revenue 
(coef: -51.15, p<0.01), and net outpatient service revenue (coef: -23.88, p<0.05). The estimate 
for operating margin, although negative, is not statistically significant. By contrast, many of the 
estimates in Panel B are positive and significant. For example, the post-reform period is 
associated with a statistically significant increase in GPSR (coef: 378.9, p<0.01), net inpatient 
service revenue (coef: 40.37, p<0.01), and net outpatient service revenue (coef: 56.38, p<0.01). 
However, total costs also increase (coef: 98.93, p<0.01), and there is no significant change in 
operating margin. In Panel C, the estimates generally have the same sign and significance level 




Table 2.1. Financial Performance Difference-in-Differences Results 
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Observations 956 1164 1164 1164 1162 
Note: Standard error in parentheses. All regressions include hospital and year fixed effects. Pre-reform reference 
period includes fiscal years 2001–2005 (2003–2005 for operating margin). Reform transition period includes fiscal 
years 2006–2008. Post-reform period includes fiscal years 2009–2018 (2009–2017 for operating margin). Gross 
patient service revenue, net inpatient service revenue, net outpatient service revenue, and total costs are expressed 
as dollars million. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 2.2 displays the results from estimating Equation (1) on the utilization measures. 
Column (1) shows the results for total inpatient discharges, column (2) shows the results for total 
outpatient visits, and column (5) shows the results for emergency room visits. Columns (3) and 
(4) present the results for inpatient service revenue per discharge and outpatient service revenue 




Table 2.2. Utilization Difference-in-Differences Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 














































































Observations 1176 1176 1163 1144 1162 
Note: Standard error in parentheses. All regressions include hospital and year fixed effects. Pre-reform reference 
period includes fiscal years 2001–2005. Reform transition period includes fiscal years 2006–2008. Post-reform 
period includes fiscal years 2009–2018. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 2.2 Panel A shows that safety-net hospitals in the post-reform period experienced a 
statistically significant decline in inpatient discharges relative to non-safety-net hospitals (coef: -
1683.9, p<0.01), but also saw a statistically significant increase in outpatient visits (coef: 
59256.3, p<0.05) and ER visits (coef: 9368.3, p<0.01). The estimates for inpatient service 
revenue per discharge and outpatient service revenue per visit are also negative and significant 
(coef: -1942.4, p<0.01 and coef: -259.4, p<0.01), which are consistent with the unadjusted 
financial performance results observed in the previous table. Moving on to Panels B and C, many 
of the estimates again flip sign from negative to positive, although most fail to achieve statistical 
significance. The one exception is ER visits which stays large, positive, and significant 




Table 2.3. Difference-in-Differences Results—MCR Data 














































































Observations 1179 1183 1179 1183 1183 
Note: Standard error in parentheses. All regressions include hospital and year fixed effects. Pre-reform reference 
period includes fiscal years 2001–2005. Reform transition period includes fiscal years 2006–2008. Post-reform 
period includes fiscal years 2009–2018. Gross patient service revenue, net inpatient service revenue, net outpatient 
service revenue, and total costs are expressed as dollars million. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 2.3 presents the results from estimating Equation (1) on the financial performance 
and utilization measures available in the MCR data. Although the measures are not exact one-to-
one matches across both datasets, the estimates presented here should be roughly comparable to 
the estimates shown in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. In fact, the results are very similar. Looking at Panel 
A, the reform is associated with statistically significant declines in GPSR (coef: -124.6, p<0.01), 
net patient revenue (coef: -49.66, p< 0.01), and total costs (coef: -44.37, p<0.01) for safety-net 
hospitals with no significant change in operating margin. Panel B shows that the reform is 
associated with statistically significant increases in GPSR (coef: 255.0, p<0.01), net patient 
revenue (coef: 75.31, p<0.01), and total costs (coef: 79.27, p<0.01) for safety-net hospitals with 
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no significant change in operating margin. Panel C shows the same pattern as Panel B, although 
the estimates are again not quite as large in magnitude. 
 
V.B Event Study Results 
Figures 2.7 and 2.8 plot the event study coefficients and confidence intervals over time 
for hospitals classified as safety-net under the restrictive and CMS definitions, respectively. The 
event study graphs for hospitals that self-report receiving supplemental payments are shown in 
Figure 2.9. Appendix tables A through F report the coefficients and standard errors associated 
with these graphs. Across all three definitions, the event study graphs do not show statistically 
significant coefficients for any outcome measure prior to the reform. This provides some 
evidence that the parallel trends assumption is satisfied. 
The same general patterns observed in the difference-in-differences results can be seen in 
the event study graphs. Among the seven hospitals classified as safety net under the restrictive 
definition, both GPSR and total costs declined gradually after the reform. Net inpatient service 
revenue dropped sharply after 2008 while net outpatient service revenue dropped once in 2009 
just after the reform, held steady for a few years, and then fell again. When the safety-net 
definition is relaxed to include more hospitals, the event study graphs show a gradual rise in 
GPSR and total costs after the reform. Net inpatient and net outpatient revenue grow during the 
transition period and remain above their pre-reform levels, but do not show any further changes 
in the post-reform period.  
In terms of utilization, the initial seven safety-net hospitals underwent an immediate drop 
in total inpatient discharges while total outpatient visits grew steadily. Both inpatient service 
revenue per discharge and outpatient service revenue per visit show a sustained decline. Once 
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again, though, when more hospitals are counted as safety net, these changes in utilization 
become more muted. No change in total inpatient discharges occurs until 2011 (for CMS-defined 
safety-net hospitals) and no change in total outpatient visits occurs until 2015 (for hospitals that 
self-report receiving supplemental payments). Similarly, only inpatient service revenue per 
discharge shows a gradual and uneven decline in the post-reform period for self-reporting 
hospitals. ER visits is the one outcome measure that shows a consistent increase, regardless of 
how safety-net hospitals are identified. 






















Note: Vertical lines denote reform transition period. Fiscal year 2005 is omitted to serve as reference year. 
 
VI. Discussion 
When Massachusetts enacted health care reform in 2006, the state set a precedent for the 
national ACA law that passed four years later. Both pieces of legislation sought to confer 
universal health insurance by reforming the non-group insurance market, mandating that all 
individuals purchase insurance, and expanding Medicaid and providing subsidies to help 
individuals comply the mandate. To help cover the costs of the subsidies and Medicaid 
expansion, both laws also contain provisions which divert funds previously set aside for safety-
net hospitals—those that traditionally served a disproportionate number of low-income and 
uninsured patients. Since the federal ACA reductions are scheduled to begin in 2021 and 
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continue for the next five years, this study examines the financial health of safety-net hospitals in 
Massachusetts following the state’s 2006 reform.  
This study uses three different definitions to identify safety-net hospitals. The first is a 
very restrictive definition previously established in the literature and which identifies only the 
hospitals that serve the greatest number of disadvantaged patients. The second is the definition 
used by CMS to identify the hospitals to which states must send supplemental payments. Lastly, 
this study also examines hospitals which self-report receiving supplemental payments. By doing 
so, this study also captures the additional hospitals, beyond the handful identified by CMS, that 
Massachusetts considers to be safety net. 
The results suggest that the largest safety-net hospitals—the ones that cared for the 
greatest number of disadvantaged patients—experienced a decline in revenue because of the 
reform. These hospitals also saw a decline in total costs, a decline in inpatient utilization, and an 
increase in outpatient utilization. When the definition used to identify safety-net hospitals is 
relaxed to include hospitals that serve fewer low-income patients, the results change and, in 
many ways, become the mirror opposite of what they were before. The reform instead becomes 
associated with an increase in revenue and total costs. The number of inpatient discharges and 
outpatient visits also do not adjust to the same extent. 
One possible interpretation of these results is that the hospitals which served many low-
income patients relied heavily on the supplemental payments as a source of revenue. The 
revenue from the newly insured patients was not enough to compensate for the loss in income 
caused by the withdrawn payments. These hospitals thus responded by aggressively transferring 
operations from inpatient facilities to outpatient centers as a cost-cutting maneuver. Generally, 
outpatient centers are less expensive to run because they do not suffer from the same overhead 
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costs as inpatient facilities. For example, inpatient facilities operate 24/7, are required by law to 
have a certain proportion of registered nurses to patients, and will take on far more medically 
complex cases.  
By contrast, the hospitals that served fewer low-income patients but are still considered 
safety net by either CMS or the state of Massachusetts may have received significantly less in 
terms of supplemental payments. These hospitals may have covered the expense of treating their 
low-income and uninsured patients using revenue from other more profitable services. The 
reform therefore led to an increase in revenue, although, as has been the case across the nation, 
costs rose as well. One interesting finding is that, for both groups of safety-net hospitals, revenue 
and costs appear to have moved together in ways that offset each other to produce no statistically 
significant change in operating margin. This can be seen most easily by comparing the revenue 
and cost estimates from the MCR data. 
All safety-net hospitals, regardless of how they were defined, experienced a sustained 
increase in ER visits. Medical care delivered in emergency room settings is expensive. In 
addition, if patients enter the ER with conditions that can be treated elsewhere, then those visits 
consume resources that could be spent on patients who truly need emergency care. One of the 
hoped-for consequences of expanding insurance in Massachusetts and at the national level was a 
reduction in ER visits as individuals learn to seek care in more appropriate settings. However, 
the ER finding in the event study analysis suggests the opposite occurs in both the short and long 
run. This is consistent with previous literature on insurance expansions, perhaps most notably the 
Oregon Health Insurance Experiment (Finkelstein et al. 2012). This may be because Medicaid 
reimbursement is so low that few providers are willing to accept new Medicaid patients, and so 
the newly insured have no choice but to seek care at the ER.  
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The federal funds set aside for supplemental payments are first allotted to states and then 
distributed to safety-net hospitals. The first federal allotment reduction, totaling $4 billion, is 
scheduled to take effect in 2021. Further reductions of $8 billion each are scheduled to occur 
every year from 2022 through 2025. On September 25, 2019, CMS finalized its proposed method 
for implementing the reductions. The agency will apply smaller reductions to states with 
historically low federal funding allotments and larger reductions to states with lower uninsured 
rates. Larger reductions will also be levied against states that do not target their payments to 
hospitals with high Medicaid volumes (MACPAC 2020a).  
Each year, the Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access Commission (MACPAC) issues 
a report to Congress that, among other Medicaid-related topics, covers the state of the 
supplemental payments. In its most recent report, the commission notes the wide variation in 
how states distribute the supplemental payments. In 2015, about 14 percent of hospitals met the 
CMS criteria for safety-net status. This is roughly comparable to the 20 percent identified as 
safety net in the state of Massachusetts under the CMS criteria for this study. Three states made 
payments to fewer than 10 percent of the hospitals in their state (Arkansas, Iowa, and Maine), 
while three states made payments to more than 90 percent of hospitals in their state (New York, 
Oregon, and Rhode Island). Similarly, while some states targeted the largest share of their 
supplemental payments to CMS-defined hospitals, others more evenly dispersed their payments. 
Nationally, the CMS-defined safety-net hospitals represented 30 percent of all safety-net 
hospitals but received nearly 66 percent of all supplemental payments (MACPAC 2020a). 
The challenge in identifying safety-net hospitals and making payments to them has 
appeared in other contexts as well. Chatterjee et al. (2020) document how the absence of a clear 
definition for safety-net status made it difficult for the Department of Health and Human 
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Services to target pandemic-related resources. The authors recommend reimagining safety-net 
status as a place along a sliding scale rather than a binary indicator that switches on after 
crossing some threshold. This would be in keeping with the results presented here, which suggest 
the largest safety-net hospitals in Massachusetts took a financial hit because of the state’s 2006 
reform, but that others fared much better and may have even benefitted. 
If the Massachusetts experience is indicative of what will happen nationally, and if 
hospitals in other states are able to respond in the same way as the Massachusetts hospitals, then 
safety-net hospitals may not be as financially vulnerable as one might assume. Even so, states 
may wish to respond by making selective cuts to the hospitals that have traditionally received 
payments but which serve comparatively fewer low-income and uninsured patients, rather than 
applying the cuts proportionally to all hospitals that have received payments. Certainly, the 
safety-net hospitals in states that did not expand Medicaid are the most at risk, and so these states 
may also want to reconsider expanding Medicaid. The American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 
provides an additional incentive for these states to expand Medicaid by increasing the states’ 
regular matching rate for the current Medicaid enrollees by five percentage points for two years. 
This would be in addition to the 90 percent match rate for the new enrollees. The Kaiser Family 
Foundation estimates this incentive would provide a net fiscal benefit to the non-expansion states 
(Corallo, Rudowitz, and Garfield 2021). In any case, when the federal reductions do begin, the 
financial health of safety-net hospitals across the nation should be closely monitored. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
This paper examines the financial performance and utilization of safety-net hospitals in 
Massachusetts following the state’s 2006 reform, which served as the foundation for the 2010 
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Affordable Care Act. As part of the reform, the state withdrew funds previously set aside for 
hospitals that cared for high percentages of low-income and uninsured patients. In contrast to 
earlier studies, this paper analyzes three sets of safety-net hospitals wherein each set consists of 
hospitals identified as safety net according to different criteria. Finally, this paper also uses a 17-
year long panel of data to test pre-trends and tease out the long-term effects of the reform. Earlier 
studies limited their scope to a select handful of hospitals and used only one or two years of post-
reform data. 
The results indicate that the reform may have threatened the financial solvency of the 
state’s largest providers of uncompensated care, as these hospitals experienced a sharp and 
immediate decline in patient revenue. The results also point to these hospitals seeing a decrease 
in inpatient discharges and an increase in outpatient visits, which suggests they may have 
deliberately transferred operations from their inpatient facilities to their outpatient centers as a 
cost-cutting maneuver. Total costs fell for this group, and operating margin did not change in any 
statistically significant way. When the criteria used to identify hospitals as safety net are 
broadened to include more hospitals, the results change. Although there is still no change in 
operating margin, the reform becomes associated with an increase in patient revenue and total 
costs. In addition, the reform is no longer associated with shifts in patient volume from inpatient 
facilities to outpatient centers.  
The federal government sits on the cusp of reducing its financial support for states to 
make supplemental payments to their safety-net hospitals. Since the results presented here show 
that the Massachusetts reform impacted safety-net hospitals differently based on how much care 
they provide to low-income and uninsured patients, states may wish to respond to the reductions 
by targeting their remaining funds to their most financially vulnerable hospitals. In addition, non-
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Medicaid expanding states may wish to reconsider adopting the expansion, as their safety-net 
hospitals will likely see their supplemental payments withdrawn without a corresponding 











The Affordable Care Act (ACA) represents one of the largest insurance expansions in 
recent history (Courtemanche, Marton, and Yelowitz 2016; Obama 2016; Gruber and Sommers 
2019). The primary components of the ACA were implemented in 2014, including the individual 
mandate, subsidized Marketplace coverage, and state Medicaid expansions. A growing literature 
has evaluated how state-specific insurance coverage, access to care, and self-assessed health 
changed following the law’s implementation. Studies focusing on the causal effects of the ACA 
tend to find that the law increased insurance coverage and access to care, but these improvements 
in coverage and access did not translate into clear measurable improvements in self-assessed 
health.8  
One reason for the lack of health improvements may be that coverage gains were 
concentrated among a relatively healthy group of individuals or among relatively sick individuals 
where health investments require time to translate into better health. While the literature (Wehby 
and Lyu 2018; Yue et al. 2018; Courtemanche et al. 2019b; Courtemanche et al. 2020a) has 
produced heterogeneous subgroup effects among different demographic groups (e.g., by income, 
 
8 Coverage studies include Sommers et al. (2014), Sommers et al. (2015), Golberstein et al. (2015), McMorrow et al. 
(2016), Wherry and Miller (2016), Benitez et al. (2016), Buchmueller et al. (2016), Courtemanche et al. (2017) , 
Frean et al. (2017), Hinde (2017), Kaestner et al. (2017), Heim et al. (2018), Collins et al. (2018), Berchick et al. 
(2019), Courtemanche, Marton, and Yelowitz (2020a) , and Courtemanche et al. (2020b). Access to care studies 
include Sommers et al. (2016), Shartzer et al. (2016), and Kirby and Vistnes (2016), in addition to the previously 
mentioned papers.  Studies focusing on health and health behaviors include Sommers et al. (2012), Simon et al. 
(2017), Miller and Wherry (2017), Sommers et al. (2017), Courtemanche et al. (2018a) , Courtemanche et al. 
(2018b) , Borgschulte and Vogler (2019), Courtemanche et al. (2019a) , Graves et al. (2020), and Soni et al. (2020). 
Other outcomes considered in the literature include employment (Kaestner et al., 2017), political participation 




gender, race etc.) few studies have focused on the causal effect of the ACA on those with chronic 
conditions, that may have rendered them “uninsurable” prior to the ACA, compared to those who 
are considered in good health. 
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the impact of the ACA Medicaid expansion on 
health insurance coverage, access to care, and self-reported health, separately for the newly 
eligible with and without chronic conditions using data from the Behavioral Risk Factor 
Surveillance System (BRFSS) between 2011 and 2018. The BRFSS is a commonly used data 
source in the ACA literature because it includes a number of questions related to the health status 
of individuals, health care access, and self-assessed health. The BRFSS it is large enough to 
precisely estimate the effects of state policy interventions and includes a number of questions 
that identify chronic conditions, making it especially suitable to evaluate the impact on the 
population that would potentially benefit most from improved access to care. To the best of our 
knowledge, ours is the first paper to examine the causal impact the ACA Medicaid expansion on 
a variety of measures of access to care and self-assessed health separately for those with and 
without chronic conditions using a national sample and five years of post-reform data.9 
We contribute to the literature by estimating difference-in-differences (DD) models in 
order to isolate the impact of the ACA Medicaid expansion among the newly eligible by 
comparing changes over time for individuals in states that expanded Medicaid to individuals in 
states that did not expand Medicaid. These models are estimated for the full newly eligible 
sample, as well as separately for those meeting the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
 
9 Myerson and Crawford (2020) examine the impact of the ACA on one measure of access to care (insurance 
coverage) using five years of post-reform data. They do not appear to restrict the sample to those with low incomes 
who most likely would qualify for Medicaid in their Medicaid expansion analysis, leading them to find smaller than 
anticipated coverage impacts. Their chronic condition disease set is also smaller and includes a different set of 
conditions compared to our definition (which is based on the CDC guidelines). 
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(CDC) definition of having a chronic health condition and those that do not. We also estimate 
event study models in order to both look for evidence of parallel trends in the pre-period and 
examine year-by-year changes in our outcomes of interest in the post-period. Finally, we 
estimate a large number of robustness checks that evaluate the validity of our results. 
Our results suggest that the ACA Medicaid expansion led to improvements in access to 
care among those with and without chronic health conditions. While the magnitude of these 
improvements are mostly larger for those with a chronic health condition, the differences in 
magnitude are not statistically significant. For example, the ACA Medicaid expansion led to a 
10.1 percentage point increase in the likelihood of having any insurance coverage among the 
chronic health condition group as compared to a 7.7 percentage point increase among those 
without a chronic health condition. We also find statistically significant improvements in self-
assessed health for those without chronic health conditions. In particular, the ACA Medicaid 
expansion led to a 3 percentage point increase in the likelihood of reporting good or better 
health, a 3 percentage point increase in the likelihood of reporting very good or excellent health, 
and a 2 percentage point increase in the likelihood of reporting excellent health among those 
without chronic health conditions.   
In addition, we find larger improvements in access to care among those with chronic 
health conditions in states with higher-than-average 2013 uninsured rates for those with chronic 
conditions. The overall 10.1 percentage point increase in coverage among those with a chronic 
health condition mentioned above reflects a 14.2 percentage point increase in states with a 
higher-than-average pre-ACA uninsured rate for the chronic condition group, and a 6.0 
percentage point increase in states with a below average pre-ACA uninsured rate for the chronic 
condition group. These gains in access in states with a higher-than-average pre-ACA chronic 
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condition uninsured rate did not translate into improvements in self-assessed health among those 
with chronic conditions. 
These results shed new light on the differential impact of a coverage expansion on those 
with versus those without a chronic health condition. This is important as additional states are 
considering expanding Medicaid, yet little is known about the capacity of these state health care 
systems and whether or not they are resilient enough to accommodate the diverse care needs of 
the newly eligible patient population without affecting overall access to care at the system level.  
 
II. Data 
Our analysis uses data from the BRFSS, an annual representative telephone survey of 
health and health behaviors of the US population conducted across all 50 states and the District 
of Columbia. The BRFSS collects information on more than 300,000 adults per year providing a 
large sample size that is critical to obtaining meaningful precision because the ACA Medicaid 
expansion affected health insurance coverage and subsequently health for only a fraction of the 
population. The BRFSS is a commonly used data source in the ACA literature on health care 
access and self-assessed health because it continuously surveys individuals on many health 
outcomes and behaviors while also providing state identifiers to assign individuals to Medicaid 
expansion and non-expansion states (Simon et al., 2017; Courtemanche et al., 2018a; 
Courtemanche et al., 2018b; and Courtemanche et al., 2019a). 
Our main analysis uses BRFSS data from 2011 to 2018. We begin our sample in 2011 to 
have a sufficient number of pre-Medicaid expansion years over which we can compare trends 
between expansion and non-expansion states. In addition, 2011 is the first year in which the 
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BRFSS included cell phones in its sampling frame. We use data until the last available wave, 
which is 2018, to follow the long-term effects of the ACA Medicaid expansions.  
We limit our sample to low-income adults aged 19–64 years old who were interviewed 
between 2011 and 2018, as they were the individuals most likely to gain eligibility under the 
Medicaid expansion. We classify individuals as low-income if their reported household income 
was below or equal to 100 percent of the Federal Poverty Limit (FPL). The BRFSS provides 
household income information in brackets, so we use the mean of the household income bracket 
and the household size to assign a FPL level to each respondent.  
We also stratify our sample into those diagnosed with a chronic disease in the past and 
those who have not. Our primary chronic health condition indicator is based on the CDC chronic 
disease conditions list (heart disease, cancer, chronic lung disease, stroke, diabetes) using 
affirmative responses to BRFSS questions about whether the respondent has ever been diagnosed 
with a heart attack, angina or coronary heart disease, stroke, asthma, skin cancer, any other type 
of cancer, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), emphysema or chronic bronchitis, 
arthritis, or diabetes.10 In addition, we experiment with a broader definition that also includes 
any individuals who responded that they have been told that they either had a depressive 
disorder, borderline or pre-diabetes, or blindness. We also consider a narrower classification that 
only includes individuals who reported having a heart attack, heart disease, stroke, skin cancer, 
other cancer, or COPD. This narrower classification does not include those reporting arthritis, 
asthma, or diabetes. 
Our outcomes focus on insurance coverage, access to medical care, preventive care, and 
self-reported health status. We measure insurance coverage with a binary variable equal to one if 
 
10 For further information, see: https://www.cdc.gov/chronicdisease/about/index.htm 
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the respondent answered “yes” to having any form of health insurance, and zero otherwise. Our 
access to medical care outcomes are binary variables equal to one if the respondent has a primary 
care doctor, and having any care needed but foregone because of cost in the past twelve months, 
and zero otherwise. Our preventative care outcome is a binary variable equal to one if the 
respondent had a regular physician check-up in the past twelve months, and zero otherwise. Self-
reported health status is based on categorical variables of overall health rated as poor, fair, good, 
very good, or excellent. We create dummy variables from the categorical measure for whether 
overall health is good or better (i.e., good, very good, or excellent), very good or 
excellent, and excellent. Three other continuous measures of self-reported health status that we 
observe include the number of days of the last 30 not in good mental health, not in good physical 
health, and with health-related functional limitations. Subjective self-assessed health 
variables have been shown to be correlated with objective measures of health, such as mortality 
(Ider and Benyamini, 1997; DeSalvo et al., 2006; Phillips et al., 2010). 
We create our binary independent variable of interest, whether a state expanded 
Medicaid, based on information collected by the Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF 2020). By the 
end of 2018, 31 states and the District of Columbia expanded Medicaid and all expanded 
Medicaid before 2016 while no state expanded in 2017 or 2018. Most states expanded 
Medicaid in January 2014, while Michigan expanded in April 2014 and New Hampshire in 
August 2014. Three states (Pennsylvania, Indiana and Alaska) expanded in January, February, 
and September of 2015, respectively. Montana and Louisiana expanded in January and July of 
2016, respectively. States are classified as part of the Medicaid expansion treatment group 
beginning the month-year of their expansion. Other state-level variables include indicators for 
whether states set up their own insurance exchanges, whether these exchanges experienced 
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glitches in 2014 (KFF 2020; Kowalski 2014), and the seasonally adjusted monthly state 
unemployment rate from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
Our analysis is done at the individual-year-state level. To better account for regional 
trends in access to care and health over time we compute each respondent’s local area of 
residence within a state. The publicly available BRFSS does not include geographic identifiers 
narrower than the state, but does tell us whether the respondent resides in the center city of an 
MSA, outside the center city of an MSA but inside the county containing the center city, inside a 
suburban county of an MSA, or not in an MSA. We use this variable to construct four subgroups 
within each state: those living within a central city, suburbs, non-MSA, and within-state location 
unavailable (this is the case for respondents interviewed on their cell phone). This follows 
previous ACA work using the BRFSS (Courtemanche et al. (2018a); Courtemanche et al. 
(2018b); and Courtemanche et al. (2019a)). 
We construct individual-level control variables for age using dummy variables for five-
year increments (from 25–29 to 60–64, with 19–24 as the reference group), gender (female), 
race/ethnicity (non-Hispanic black, Hispanic, and other, with non-Hispanic white as the 
reference group), marital status (married), education (high school degree, some college, 
and college graduate, with less than a high school degree as the reference group), household 
income ($10,000–$15,000, $15,000–$20,000, $20,000–$25,000, $25,000–$35,000, $35,000–
$50,000, $50,000–$75,000, and >$75,000, with <$10,000 as the reference group), indicator 
variables for the number of children under the age of 18 in the household (with no children as 
the reference group), whether the respondent reports a primary occupation of student, and 
whether the respondent is unemployed.   
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Table 3.1 provides pretreatment means and standard deviations of our ten dependent 
variables of interest for the period of 2011 to 2013 and Appendix Table B.1 reports the means 
and standard deviations for the control variables. We stratified our full low-income sample into 
four groups based on whether the respondent’s state expanded Medicaid and whether the 
respondent has a chronic health condition. According to Table 3.1, 79 percent of the full low-
income sample had some form of health insurance prior to 2014. Individuals in Medicaid 
expansion states (columns 2 and 3) were more likely to have insurance prior to 2014 than those 
in non-expansion states (columns 4 and 5). In both expansion and non-expansion states, 
individuals with a chronic health condition were more likely to have coverage, a primary care 
doctor, and a recent check-up as compared to those without such a condition prior to the 
expansion. Similarly, individuals with a chronic health condition reported worse self-assessed 
health and more days with health problems as compared to those without a chronic condition in 




Table 3.1. Means and Standard Deviations of Dependent Variables by State Medicaid Expansion 
Status and Chronic Condition Status 
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Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
III. Methods 
Our goal is to estimate the effect of the Medicaid expansion among the newly eligible 
population by comparing outcomes in expansion states to non-expansion states before versus 
after the expansions. To do so, we follow the literature and estimate difference-in-differences 
(DD) models. Formally, the model is as follows:   
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾3(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
+𝛾𝛾4𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
(1) 
where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represents one of our outcome variables for individual 𝑖𝑖 in area type (central city, 
rest of MSA, non-MSA, cell phone) a in state s in month-year t.  𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 equals one if state 
s participated in the ACA’s Medicaid expansion and 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an indicator equal to one in state 
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s beginning at the date of the Medicaid expansion. 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector of control variables described 
above, 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 denotes fixed effects for each time-by-area-type combination (e.g., central city in 
April 2011), and  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 denotes fixed effects for each area (e.g., non-MSA in Kentucky). Note that 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is absorbed by the time fixed effects (𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) and  𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 is absorbed by the area 
fixed effects (𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) so both are not estimated in Equation (1). We use sampling weights to 
account for the complex survey design.  
The DD model requires identification through the parallel trends assumption. To 
indirectly test the parallel trends assumption and to investigate how the Medicaid expansion 
effects varied over time, we estimate event-study models where we replace 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 with a set of 
year dummies: 
 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜑𝜑 + � 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 × 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖)
𝑇𝑇
𝑖𝑖=2011
 + 𝛿𝛿𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (2) 
where Yt, is an indicator for whether year t is 2011, 2012, …, 2018, with 2013 being the omitted 
reference year and the other terms being as described in Equation (1). The effects of the 
Medicaid expansion during 2014, 2015, …, 2018 are given by (𝜃𝜃2014 × 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖), 
(𝜃𝜃2015 × 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖),  …, ( 𝜃𝜃2018 × 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖) respectively.  
The parallel trends assumption suggests that the trends in outcomes for Medicaid 
expansion and non-expansion states would have been the same in the absence of the expansion. 
We can test this indirectly during the pre-expansion period by examining interactions between 
the Medicaid expansion indicator and the pre-expansion years of 2011 and 2012 relative to the 
excluded year of 2013. If the coefficients on these interactions (𝜃𝜃2011, 𝜃𝜃2012) are insignificant 





The top panel of Tables 3.2 and 3.3 presents the regression results from Equation (1) that 
measure the effect of the ACA Medicaid expansion on access to care and self-reported health 
among low-income individuals, respectively. In the first row we display the full sample effect of 
the ACA Medicaid expansion on our outcomes of interest. In the second and third row we 
stratify the sample into chronic and non-chronic subsamples. The bottom panel of Tables 3.2 and 
3.3 present the results of the event study analysis based on Equation (2). 
 
VI.A Effects on Access to Care 
The first column suggests that the ACA Medicaid expansion increased the probability of 
having insurance by 8.8 percentage points. Individuals with a chronic health condition are 
somewhat more likely to gain coverage (10.1 percentage points) as compared to those without a 
chronic health condition (7.7 percentage points), though the estimates are not statistically 
significant different from each other. Thus, we find that the Medicaid expansion had large effects 
on insurance coverage among both groups of individuals. The fact that we do not observe a 
larger differential increase among those with a chronic condition could reflect both demand-side 
conditions, as those with a chronic condition were already more likely to seek coverage prior to 
the ACA, and supply-side conditions, as states may have already been targeting those with 









Check-Up Cost Barrier 
Full Low-Income Group     








Sample Size 225,159 225,084 225,931 225,300 
Chronic Group     








Sample Size 119,705 119,622 119,979 119,681 
Non-Chronic Group     








Sample Size 105,454 105,462 105,952 105,619 
Event-Study Model Full Income Group     
























































Note: BRFSS sampling weights are used. All regressions include state×location type and year×location type fixed 
effects as well as the controls. Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. 
*** indicates statistically significant at 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level. In addition, we denote statistically 
significantly different effects in a post expansion year relative to 2014 by ^^^ at 1% level; ^^ at 5% level; ^ at 10% 
level. Finally, we denote statistically significantly different effects for the chronic vs. non-chronic group by ### at 





Table 3.3. Effects of ACA Medicaid Expansion on Self-Assessed Health 




































Sample Size 225,182 225,182 225,182 220,504 221,288 222,267 















Sample Size 119,540 119,540 119,540 116,547 117,112 117,333 















Sample Size 105,642 105,642 105,642 103,957 104,176 104,934 
Event-Study Model Full Low-Income Group 


































































































Note: BRFSS sampling weights are used. All regressions include state×location type and year×location type fixed 
effects as well as the controls. Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. 
*** indicates statistically significant at 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level. In addition, we denote statistically 
significantly different effects in a post expansion year relative to 2014 by ^^^ at 1% level; ^^ at 5% level; ^ at 10% 
level. Finally, we denote statistically significantly different effects for the chronic vs. non-chronic group by ### at 
the 1% level; ## at the 5% level; # at the 10% level. 
 
We also observe that the ACA Medicaid expansion led to increases in the probability of 
having a primary care doctor (1.9 percentage points) within the full low-income sample. This 
effect seems to be driven by those with a chronic condition (2.8 percentage points) as we observe 
no statistically significant effect among the healthy. In terms of routine check-up visits, in the 
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full low-income sample the ACA Medicaid expansion increased the likelihood of reporting a 
recent check up by 2.9 percentage points, and unsurprisingly this effect is driven by the healthy 
(3.6 percentage points) rather than the sick. In other words, we might expect those with a chronic 
health condition to be more diligent about getting a routine check-up than those without a 
chronic condition prior to gaining coverage. Reporting cost being a barrier to seeking care was 
reduced after the ACA Medicaid expansion by 5.0 percentage points for the full low-income 
sample with similar reductions for both those with a chronic condition (5.0 percentage points) 
and the healthy (4.8 percentage points). 
The bottom panel of Table 3.2 reports the results of our event study analysis. An indirect 
test of the parallel trends assumption necessary to causally interpret our results involves 
examining the interactions of the ACA Medicaid expansion indicator with the pre-reform years 
of 2011 and 2012. If expansion states and non-expansion states are comparable, we would not 
expect these pre-ACA interactions to be statistically significant. Among the eight pre-ACA 
interactions in Table 3.2, only one is statistically significant (and none out of twelve in Table 3.3, 
as will be discussed below). This gives us confidence in giving our results a causal interpretation. 
The interactions of the ACA Medicaid expansion indicator with the post-reform years of 
2014 through 2018 allow us to unpack the combined post-period impact estimates in the top 
panel into year-by-year estimates. With respect to insurance coverage, we see year-by-year 
growth in the impact of the ACA Medicaid expansion on the full low-income sample, with a 4.8 
percentage point increase in the likelihood of being covered in 2014 growing to an 8.5 
percentage point increase in 2018 that is statistically different from the 2014 effect. We also see 
a stronger impact over time on reporting cost being a barrier to care, with a 2.4 percentage point 
decrease in 2014 and a 5.0 percentage point decrease in 2018, and an increase over time in 
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respondents receiving a recent check-up, with a 3.1 percentage point increase in 2014 growing to 
a 4.7 percentage point increase in 2018. However, these coefficients are not statistically different 
in 2018 relative to 2014.11 Finally, we see no consistent pattern with respect to reporting having 
a primary care physician, with each single year interaction being statistically insignificant.  
 
VI.B Effects on Health 
The top panel of Table 3.3 reports some evidence that the ACA Medicaid expansion 
improved health for the full low-income sample after five years, with marginal improvements in 
individuals reporting “very good or excellent” health (2 percentage points) and “excellent” health 
(1.5 percentage points). Stratifying our sample shows that these results are driven by those 
without a chronic health condition. Among this group, Table 3.3 reports improvements in 
reporting “good or better” health (3.0 percentage points), “very good or excellent” health (2.9 
percentage points), and “excellent” health (2.1 percentage points). These findings may be less 
surprising given that the chronically ill may require significantly more health investments to 
improve their overall well-being. On the other hand, the healthy may only require small levels of 
health services to close gaps in care that can improve their overall well-being.  
As in Table 3.2, the bottom panel of Table 3.3 reports results from the event study 
analysis of self-assessed health. None of the twelve pre-ACA interactions with the ACA 
Medicaid expansion indicator are statistically significant, suggesting that the parallel trends 
assumption holds, and we can interpret our results causally. The post-ACA year-by-year 
interactions show essentially no statistically significant impact on self-assessed health among the 
full low-income sample, despite the statistically significant increases in reporting “very good or 
 
11 The reduction in reporting cost being a barrier to care was statistically significantly larger in 2016 (5.8 percentage 
points) and 2017 (6.2 percentage points) relative to 2014 (2.4 percentage points). 
77 
 
excellent” health and “excellent” health in the combined post-period results.12 This is likely due 
in part to less statistical power to identify each individual post-period year interaction as 
compared to estimating one combined post-period effect. 
 
VI.C Event Study Results by Chronic Condition Status 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 plot the event study coefficients and confidence intervals over time 
on the access to care and self-reported health outcomes by chronic condition status, while 
Appendix Tables I and J reports the coefficients and standard errors associated with these event 
study graphs.13 Our event study results suggest that gains in insurance coverage materialized 
immediately after 2014 with little growth in coverage over time for those with a chronic health 
condition and those without such a condition. Growth in having a primary care doctor occurred 
predominately in the early years (2014–2016) for those without a chronic health condition, with 
little effect in later years. The effect of the ACA Medicaid expansion on routine doctor checkups 
was also concentrated among those without a chronic health condition with a gradual emergence, 
highlighting that maneuvering through the health care system may take time.   
 
12 We do see a statistically significant increase in the number of days not in good physical health in 2014. 
13 Appendix Figure 1 provides similar plots as in figures 1 and 2 for each outcome for the full low-income sample.   
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We also observe different patterns of reductions in cost being a barrier to care for those 
with and without a chronic health condition. Those with a chronic health condition saw a 
consistent drop in cost being a barrier of care that disappears by 2018, while those without a 
chronic health condition experienced a growing impact in each year. By 2018 the effect for those 
without a chronic health condition was almost 15 times as large as compared to those with a 
chronic health condition (an 8.6 percentage point reduction compared to 0.6 percentage point 
reduction, respectively). Regarding self-assessed health in Figure 3.2, the improvements in good 
or better health among those without a chronic health condition emerged in 2014 and persist 
throughout 2018, while the improvements in very good or excellent health fluctuate by year. We 
observe no clear pattern of improvements in self-reported health for those with chronic health 
conditions.  
 
VI.D Varying the Definition of the Chronic Health Condition Group 
As mentioned, our primary chronic health condition indicator is based on the CDC 
chronic disease conditions list including those reporting having a heart attack, angina or coronary 
heart disease, stroke, asthma, skin cancer, any other type of cancer, chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease (COPD), emphysema or chronic bronchitis, arthritis, or diabetes. We report 
results here of both a broader definition that also includes any individuals who responded that 
they have been told that they either had a depressive disorder, borderline or pre-diabetes, or 
blindness and a narrower classification that only includes individuals who reported having a 
heart attack, heart disease, stroke, skin cancer, other cancer, or COPD. Table 3.4 reports our 
health care access results for our full low-income sample, our baseline chronic vs. non-chronic 
stratification (all repeated from Table 3.2), as well as our broader chronic vs. non-chronic 
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stratification and our narrower chronic vs. non-chronic stratification. Table 3.5 does the same 
thing for our self-assessed health results. 





Check-Up Cost Barrier 
Full Low-Income Group     








Sample Size 225,159 225,084 225,931 225,300 
Chronic Group     








Sample Size 119,705 119,622 119,979 119,681 
Non-Chronic Group     








Sample Size 105,454 105,462 105,952 105,619 
Chronic Broad Group     








Sample Size 138,710 138,616 139,073 138,698 
Non-Chronic Broad Group     








Sample Size 86,449 86,468 86,858 86,602 
Chronic Narrow Group     








Sample Size 58,090 58,079 58,221 58,089 
Non-Chronic Narrow Group     








Sample Size 167,069 167,005 167,710 167,211 
Note: BRFSS sampling weights are used.  All regressions include state×location type and year×location type fixed 
effects as well as the controls. Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. 
*** indicates statistically significant at 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level. We denote statistically significantly 





Table 3.5. Effects on Self-Assessed Health—Broadening vs. Narrowing the Chronic Classification 




































































Sample Size 105,642 105,642 105,642 103,957 104,176 104,934 















Sample Size 138,545 138,545 138,545 135,111 135,731 136,058 















Sample Size 86,637 86,637 86,637 85,393 85,557 86,209 















Sample Size 57,978 57,978 57,978 56,533 56,694 56,751 















Sample Size 167,204 167,204 167,204 163,971 164,594 165,516 
Note: All regressions include state×location type and year×location type fixed effects as well as the controls. 
Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically 
significant at 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level. BRFSS sampling weights are used. We denote statistically 





Table 3.4 suggests that the baseline findings of somewhat larger improvements in 
insurance coverage, having a primary care doctor, and reporting cost being a barrier to receiving 
care among the chronic health condition group persist whether we broaden or narrow inclusion in 
the group. The difference between the chronic (4.6 percentage point increase) vs. non chronic 
(1.4 percentage point increase) groups becomes statistically significant for the primary care 
doctor outcome under the narrow definition of having a chronic health condition. Our baseline 
results suggest a larger improvement in the likelihood of receiving a check-up among the non-
chronic group, while there is almost no difference for either the broader (2.9 percentage point 
increase vs. 2.7 percentage point increase) or narrower (3.0 percentage point increase vs. 2.7 
percentage point increase) chronic health condition classification. None of these differences are 
statistically significantly different. That being said, the baseline coefficient associated with 
receiving a check-up (1.9 percentage point increase) for the chronic group becomes statistically 
significant when we either broaden (2.9 percentage point increase) or narrow (3.0 percentage 
point increase) the inclusion criteria. 
Table 3.5 suggests that the larger relative increases we observed in our baseline non-
chronic condition group in reporting “good or better” health, “very good or excellent” health, or 
“excellent” health remain whether we broaden or narrow the definition of a chronic health 
condition. The difference between the narrow chronic and the narrow non-chronic groups is 
statistically significant for the “very good or excellent” health outcome and the “excellent” 
health outcome. The coefficients associated with the three “days of poor health” measures are 
almost never statistically significant across all three chronic health condition classifications. 
Thus, Tables 3.4 and 3.5 suggest that our baseline results are not sensitive to changes in the 
classification of chronic health conditions. 
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VI.E Other Specification Checks 
Appendix Tables K and L present results from our specification checks for the full low-
income sample. The first set of results evaluates whether our main results hold when we change 
the composition of the sample. Specifically, we drop those who were interviewed via cell phone, 
those who were young enough (19–25 years old) to have been potentially impacted by the ACA 
dependent coverage expansion, states that expanded Medicaid “early” prior to 2014, and states 
that expanded Medicaid after 2014.14 We also evaluate whether dropping the sample weights 
materially affects our outcomes. In our last check we allow those with higher incomes to remain 
in the sample by raising the income limit to anyone below 200 percent of the FPL (rather than 
100 percent of the FPL). 
According to Appendix Table B.4, our health care access results are remarkably robust to 
the changing sample. Dropping 19–25 year-olds reduces the effect on having a primary care 
doctor, and results from the sample including everyone making less than 200 percent of the FPL 
expectedly attenuates our findings across all outcomes to at least some degree. Appendix Table 
B.5 suggest that coefficients on our self-assessed health outcomes display a marginally larger 
amount of variability as we change the sample. Specifically, we observe that our baseline 
statistically significant results on “very good or excellent” health (2.0 percentage points) and 
“excellent” health (1.5 percentage points) from Table 3.3 both become statistically insignificant 
in two specifications (drop 19–25 year-olds and increase the sample income limit) and one of the 
 
14 Early expansion states are California (11/1/2010) Connecticut (4/1/2010), D.C. (7/1/2010), Minnesota (3/1/2010), 
New Jersey (4/14/2011), and Washington (1/3/2011). Late expansion states are Alaska (9/1/2015), Indiana 
(2/1/2015), Louisiana (7/1/2016), Michigan (4/1/2014), Montana (1/1/2016), New Hampshire (8/15/2014), and 






two become statistically insignificant in two other specifications (drop cell phone uses and drop 
early expansion states) due to larger standard errors and an attenuation of the estimated 
coefficients. Overall, our specification checks suggest that our main results are largely 
unchanged by restricting and expanding the sample, and therefore provide additional support for 
the validity of these results. 
 
VI.F Exploring Heterogeneous Effects 
There are several potential explanations as to why we do not observe differential increases in 
access among those with a chronic condition compared to those without a chronic condition. For 
example, state eligibility requirements to qualify for Medicaid in the pre-ACA period were 
typically more generous for those with chronic health conditions, ceteris paribus. Thus, although 
one might expect the Medicaid expansion to increase demand for access to care for those with 
chronic health conditions, because such individuals are more likely to enroll given the higher 
value they place on coverage, a smaller share of those individuals were uncovered prior to the 
ACA. This is illustrated in Figures 3.3 and 3.4 which display 2013 uninsured rates stratified by 
chronic condition status and by state, with Figure 3.3 focusing on expansion states and Figure 3.4 
on non-expansion states, respectively.15 Another reason may be that states with higher 
percentages of uninsured individuals with a chronic health condition did not expand their 
Medicaid programs, as suggested by Figures 3.3 and 3.4, which could attenuate the overall 
increase in demand for access that we observe in our main results in Table 3.2.16  
 
15 Among expansion states, Washington D.C had the lowest uninsured rate for those with chronic health conditions 
at 9.8 percent and Arkansas had the highest rate at 48.4 percent. Among non-expansions states, Maine had the 
lowest rate at 13.7 percent and Texas had the highest rate at 53.3 percent. However, individuals with chronic 
conditions generally had lower uninsured rates in each state compared to those without a chronic condition.   
16 The average uninsured rate for those with chronic health conditions in 2013 was 29.38 percent in expansion states 
and 43.76 percent in non-expansion states. 
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An additional consideration is whether access to care changed pre- to post-ACA due to 
Medicaid policy changes that impacted the supply side of the health care market. For example, 
primary care providers initially received higher reimbursement rates for accepting new Medicaid 
patients after the ACA (Snyder et al., 2014). Thus, even among individuals with a chronic health 
condition that had coverage pre-ACA, access to care may have improved due to such supply-side 
factors. Ultimately our baseline results reflect both these supply-side factors and the demand-side 
factors mentioned above.  
In an attempt to isolate the demand-side response associated with gaining coverage, we 
conduct additional analysis where we add controls for medical care market supply-side factors. 
Specifically, we control for the state specific changes after the ACA in Medicaid primary care 
reimbursement fees and the total number of primary care providers.17 Because these supply-side 
controls are only available through 2016, we compare them to an updated version of our baseline 
analysis that only includes data through 2016.
 
17 County Health Rankings and Roadmaps, a Robert Wood Johnson Foundation program, publishes county- and 
state-level data that include the average Medicare reimbursement per enrollee (see 
https://www.countyhealthrankings.org/app/). We use these data and the Medicaid-to-Medicare Fee Indices published 
by the Kaiser Family Foundation to obtain the average Medicaid reimbursement per enrollee (see Zuckerman and 
Goin (2012), Zuckerman, Skopec, and McCormack (2014), and Zuckerman, Skopec, and Epstein (2017)). The total 
number of primary care providers are calculated using data from the National Plan and Provider Enumeration 














 Tables 3.6 and 3.7 report the results of this analysis. We find that including supply 
control variables somewhat increases the coefficient estimates for both the chronic and non-
chronic sub-samples, though most of them are not statistically significantly different compared to 
our updated baseline results. However, the new coefficients from the regressions with the 
supply-side controls are economically meaningful. For example, among the chronic sub-sample 
we observe in Table 3.7 a statistically significant increase of 1.5 percentage points in reporting 
“excellent" health, and a statistically significant reduction in days not in good physical health of 
0.568 days. Among the non-chronic sub-sample, we observe a statistically significant 3.7 
percentage point reduction in cost being a barrier to care in Table 3.6 and a statistically 
significant 2.9 percentage point increase in reporting “excellent” health in Table 3.7.  
In other additional analysis we estimate our chronic vs. non-chronic regressions 
separately for states with above and below median pre-ACA chronic group uninsured rates. We 
do this to account for other unobservable supply-side differences between states with “high” 
versus “low” uninsured rates. A second reason for doing this is that we would expect a stronger 
demand-side impact of the ACA among individuals with a chronic health condition in states with 
high chronic group uninsured rates as compared to individuals with a chronic health condition in 










Check-Up Cost Barrier 
Full Low-Income Group     








Sample Size 143,737 143,730 144,217 143,845 
Chronic Group     








Sample Size 76,335 76,307 76,497 76,327 
Non-Chronic Group     








Sample Size 67,402 67,423 67,720 67,518 
Chronic Group – Supply Controls     








Sample Size 75,445 75,418 75,607 75,439 
Non-Chronic Group – Supply Controls     








Sample Size 66,903 66,925 67,221 67,019 
Note: BRFSS sampling weights are used.  All regressions include state×location type and year×location type fixed 
effects as well as the controls. Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. 
*** indicates statistically significant at 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level. We denote statistically significantly 
different effects for the chronic vs. non-chronic group ### at the 1% level; ## at the 5% level; # at the 10% level. We 
also denote statistically significant different effects for the chronic (non-chronic) supply control groups compared 





Table 3.7. Effects on Self-Assessed Health—Controlling for Medical Care Market Supply-Side 
Factors 




































































Sample Size 67,519 67,519 76,224 66,476 66,605 67,115 















Sample Size 75,335 75,335 75,335 73,492 73,830 73,971 















Sample Size 67,019 67,019 67,019 65,988 66,118 66,618 
Note: All regressions include state×location type and year×location type fixed effects as well as the controls. 
Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically 
significant at 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level. BRFSS sampling weights are used. We denote statistically 
significantly different effects for the chronic vs. non-chronic group ### at the 1% level; ## at the 5% level; # at the 
10% level. We also denote statistically significant different effects for the chronic (non-chronic) supply control 
groups compared to the chronic (non-chronic) baseline results with ^^^ at the 1% level, ^^ at the 5% level, and ^ at 





Tables 3.8 and 3.9 report the results of this analysis. We find that the effects on access to 
care are generally much stronger for the chronic group in states with high pre-ACA chronic 
uninsured rates (14.2 percentage point increase in coverage and a 5.2 percentage point increase 
in the probability of having a primary care doctor) compared to the full sample chronic group 
results (10.1 percentage point increase in coverage and a 2.8 percentage point increase in the 
probability of having a primary care doctor), while we observe little difference in access to care 
for the non-chronic group when making the same comparison. In low pre-ACA chronic 
uninsured rate states, we observe statistically significant increases in insurance coverage and 
reduced cost being a barrier to care for the chronic group that are attenuated compared to the full 
sample chronic group results. On the other hand, we find similar strong increases in insurance 
take-up and regular check-ups for the non-chronic group in both low and high pre-ACA chronic 
uninsured rate states. These findings suggest that access to care was generally better for those 
with chronic health conditions in low chronic uninsured rate states compared to high chronic 
uninsured rate states prior to the ACA, leading to larger gains in access among the chronic group 
in high chronic uninsured rate states after the ACA Medicaid expansion. Conversely, the non-
chronic group broadly benefited from the ACA Medicaid expansion across both high and low 
pre-ACA chronic uninsured rate states.  
In terms of self-reported health, we do not observe any changes in self-reported health for 
the chronic group in high or low pre-ACA chronic uninsured rate states, but similarly strong 
improvements in self-reported health in high and low pre-ACA chronic uninsured rate states for 
the non-chronic group. Overall, the findings in Tables 3.8 and 3.9 highlight that the ACA 
Medicaid expansion greatly improved access to care for those with chronic conditions in states 
that were relatively less generous in coverage before the ACA for single adults, and that non-
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chronic individuals received significant improvements in access to care that immediately 
translated into measurable improvements in self-reported health.   








Full Low-Income Group 








Sample Size 225,159 225,084 225,931 225,300 
Chronic Group 








Sample Size 119,705 119,622 119,979 119,681 
Non-Chronic Group 








Sample Size 105,454 105,462 105,952 105,619 
Chronic Group – High Pre-ACA Chronic Condition Uninsured Rate States 








Sample Size 65,094 65,041 65,250 65,062 
Non-Chronic Group – High Pre-ACA Chronic Condition Uninsured Rate States 








Sample Size 55,299 55,337 55,556 55,365 
Chronic Group – Low Pre-ACA Chronic Condition Uninsured Rate States 








Sample Size 54,611 54,581 54,729 54,619 
Non-Chronic Group – Low Pre-ACA Chronic Condition Uninsured Rate States 








Sample Size 50,155 50,125 50,396 50,254 
Note: BRFSS sampling weights are used.  All regressions include state×location type and year×location type fixed 
effects as well as the controls. Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. 
*** indicates statistically significant at 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level. We denote statistically significantly 
different effects for the chronic vs. non-chronic group ### at the 1% level; ## at the 5% level; # at the 10% level. We 
also denote statistically significant different effects for the chronic (non-chronic) group in states with a high pre-
ACA uninsured rate compared to the chronic (non-chronic) group in states with a low pre-ACA uninsured rate with 





Table 3.9. Effects on Self-Assessed Health—High vs. Low Pre-ACA Chronic Condition 
Uninsured Rates 




































































Sample Size 105,642 105,642 105,642 103,957 104,176 104,934 















Sample Size 64,964 64,964 64,964 63,276 63,628 63,711 















Sample Size 55,351 55,351 55,351 54,400 54,573 55,004 















Sample Size 54,576 54,576 54,576 53,271 53,484 53,622 















Sample Size 50,291 50,291 50,291 49,557 49,603 49,930 
Note: All regressions include state×location type and year×location type fixed effects as well as the controls. 
Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically 
significant at 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level. BRFSS sampling weights are used. We denote statistically 
significantly different effects for the chronic vs. non-chronic group ### at the 1% level; ## at the 5% level; # at the 
10% level. We also denote statistically significant different effects for the chronic (non-chronic) group in states 
with a high pre-ACA uninsured rate compared to the chronic (non-chronic) group in states with a low pre-ACA 





This paper investigates the impact of the ACA Medicaid expansion on access to care and 
self-assessed health for individuals with and without a chronic health condition between 2014 
and 2018. To our knowledge, this is one of the first papers to rigorously compare how low-
income individuals with and without a chronic health condition have been impacted by the 
Medicaid expansion using five years of post-ACA data. Given the well documented untreated 
acute and non-acute care needs of those with chronic health conditions, it is important to 
understand how access to care changed due to the ACA Medicaid expansion and how those 
changes impacted the health of this vulnerable population.  
Our baseline results suggest that the ACA Medicaid expansion led to improvements in 
access to care among those with and without chronic health conditions. While the magnitude of 
these improvements are mostly larger for those with a chronic health condition, the differences in 
magnitude are not statistically significant. For example, the ACA Medicaid expansion leads to a 
10.1 percentage point increase in the likelihood of having any insurance coverage among the 
chronic health condition group as compared to a 7.7 percentage point increase among those 
without a chronic health condition. We also find statistically significant improvements in self-
assessed health for those without chronic health conditions. In particular, the ACA Medicaid 
expansion led to a 3 percentage point increase in the likelihood of reporting good or better 
health, a 3 percentage point increase in the likelihood of reporting very good or excellent health, 
and a 2.1 percentage point increase in the likelihood of reporting excellent health among those 
without chronic health conditions. 
Our sub-sample analysis suggests larger gains in access among those with a chronic 
health condition in states with a high pre-ACA chronic condition uninsured rate. This is 
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important because the conventional wisdom was that even states with relatively less generous 
public health insurance programs still provided Medicaid coverage for those with the greatest 
health care need as part of the social safety net prior to the ACA. Our results suggest that pre-
ACA Medicaid eligibility criteria in these states may have been excluding some of those with 
chronic health conditions and provided inadequate health care access through other means, such 
as charity care. Nevertheless, we find little evidence of improvements in self-reported health 
after the Medicaid expansion for those with chronic health conditions in states with the largest 
coverage gains, which may imply that individuals with chronic conditions require more time and 
care to recover health. 
One possible explanation for why we see improvements in self-assessed health among 
those without chronic health conditions, despite no differential improvement in access for that 
group in our baseline analysis, may be that they have more capacity for health improvement than 
those with chronic conditions. It may also be that the marginal benefit of the initial units of 
medical care for individuals without chronic conditions are prompted to consume are higher than 
the marginal benefit of the additional units of medical care consumed by those with a chronic 
health condition due to diminishing returns. Simply put, individuals with non-chronic conditions 
may be more likely to suffer from previously untreated acute care conditions that are easily 
curable, while individuals with chronic condition require care that stabilize a condition without 
immediately improving health.  Another explanation may be that our measures of access do not 
capture changes in the intensity of care received during a medical encounter due to the ACA 
Medicaid expansion. For example, those without a chronic health condition may be treated more 
intensively when they visit the doctor now that they have a consistent source of coverage that 
also reduces the marginal out-of-pocket cost for care. On the other hand, reductions in out-of-
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pocket cost of care only materialized for a small set of individuals with chronic conditions that 
didn’t have coverage before the ACA. 
Compared to previous work focusing on the overall impact of the ACA, our results 
suggest immediate and lasting improvements in access to care for those with and without a 
chronic health condition and an increase in the probability of reporting “very good or better” and 
“excellent” self-assessed health for those without a chronic health condition. These findings are 
in contrast to work that shows that improvements in access to care are only 50 percent 
attributable to the Medicaid expansion and that the improvements in self-assessed health are 
mostly attributed to the non-Medicaid portion of the ACA, e.g. the individual health insurance 
expansion (Courtemanche et al. 2018a; Courtemanche et al. 2020b). Similar to our work, other 
recent studies focusing on the Medicaid expansion have also documented immediate positive and 
lasting improvements in access to care and gradually emerging reduction in mortality among 







This dissertation explores the connection between staffing and patient volume at modern 
physician practices as well as the impact of recent reforms on safety-net hospitals in 
Massachusetts and the access to care and self-reported health outcomes of individuals with 
chronic conditions nationwide. Specifically, the first chapter explores how physician time, the 
number of non-physician clinical staff, and other non-labor inputs influence how many patients 
can be seen per week at an office. The second chapter examines how safety-net hospitals in 
Massachusetts navigated the changes in their revenue streams caused by the state’s 2006 reform. 
Finally, the last chapter investigates the impact of the 2010 Affordable Care Act on the access to 
care and self-reported health outcomes of chronically ill individuals. 
In 2006, Massachusetts passed comprehensive health care reform designed to confer 
universal insurance coverage by reforming the non-group insurance market, mandating that all 
individuals purchase insurance, and expanding Medicaid and providing subsidies to help low-
income individuals comply with the mandate. The reform also diverted funds previously set 
aside for safety-net hospitals, with the idea being that once everyone has insurance these 
supplemental payments would no longer be necessary. Four years later, Congress passed the 
Affordable Care Act, which contains many of the same features as the Massachusetts reform, 
including a provision that will soon take effect to reduce safety-net supplemental payments. Both 
reforms were associated with large increases in the number of insured persons, first in 
Massachusetts and then across the nation. 
Because the increase in the number of insured persons caused by the Affordable Care Act 
coincided with the onset of the baby boomer generation retiring, many health policy 
professionals have warned that the US health care system will be unable to meet growing patient 
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demand. The first chapter explores one potential solution to this challenge: physician practices 
may be able to better optimize their clinical staff to raise patient volume. Using unique, propriety 
data on doctor offices from 2019, I find that, for many inputs, their marginal productivity has 
declined. Similarly, while the cross-input elasticities indicate most input pairs have remained 
either complements or substitutes, the elasticities themselves are also smaller in magnitude. The 
results suggest that, perhaps as a result of increased managed care and capitated payments, 
offices have already adjusted the size and skill mix of their clinical workforce and taken other 
efficiency-improving steps over the past few decades. 
The second chapter examines the financial health of safety-net hospitals in Massachusetts 
and their trends in utilization following the state’s 2006 reform. Because the Massachusetts 
reform is like the national Affordable Care Act, the experience of safety-net hospitals in that 
state may be indicative of what will happen to safety-net hospitals nationally. Using 17 years of 
cost report data and a difference-in-differences strategy, I find that the reform reduced patient 
revenue at the largest safety-net hospitals, and that those hospitals may have tried to compensate 
for their losses by delivering more services in outpatient settings. However, when I use more 
lenient definitions to identify safety-net hospitals, the results indicating a negative financial 
shock disappear. The lesson here may then be that when the federal reductions begin, states 
should target their remaining funds to those hospitals that serve the greatest number of low-
income and uninsured patients, rather than applying the cuts evenly across all hospitals that have 
historically received supplemental payments. States that did not adopt the Medicaid expansion 
may also wish to revisit that decision, as that would reduce the number of uninsured patients 
relying on safety-net care. 
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 The final chapter, co-authored with James Marton and Benjamin Ukert, investigates how 
the Affordable Care Act impacted chronically ill individuals who may have been ineligible for 
insurance prior to the reform. This population is also of particular interest because they may 
require a higher level of medical care compared to the average Medicaid enrollee that the health 
care system is accustomed to treating. Using five years of post-reform data from the Behavioral 
Risk Factor Surveillance System and a difference-in-differences strategy, we find large 
improvements in access to care and self-reported health outcomes for individuals with and 
without chronic conditions. Although the improvements are generally larger in magnitude for 
individuals with chronic conditions, the differences are not statistically significant.  
There remains work to be done across all the topics covered in this dissertation. The 
estimates from the first chapter show the average productive relationships of labor and non-labor 
inputs at physician practices. Since these estimates can be compared to those from previous 
studies, the results also indicate how these relationships have evolved over time. Future work 
should focus on connecting the changes observed here to their underlying mechanisms. It also 
remains unclear what these productive relationships look like at other practice settings.  
As for the second chapter, once the federal reductions in supplemental payments begin, 
researchers should closely monitor the financial health of safety-net hospitals nationally. If these 
hospitals, particularly the ones in non-expansion states, become insolvent or must scale back 
operations in ways that adversely affect the communities they serve, then policymakers and other 
stakeholders will need to know. Finally, regarding the third chapter, more research investigating 
the insurance coverage and health of vulnerable populations will be needed as the population 






Table. Financial Performance Event Study Results for Hospitals Classified as Safety Net 
under the Restrictive Definition 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 





Service Rev  
($ Million) 
Net Outpatient 
Service Rev  
($ Million) 












𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2001 0 -2.456 -4.798 -16.21 -26.66 
 (.) (135.6) (14.82) (30.04) (53.12) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2002 0 10.54 15.96 -26.41 -3.852 
 (.) (120.4) (20.36) (29.21) (39.80) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2003 1.326 -2.006 20.72 -20.50 5.460 
 (2.670) (104.9) (13.70) (21.60) (31.79) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2004 -0.0903 -6.580 -7.546 -13.87 -1.568 
 (1.822) (79.57) (11.58) (15.89) (28.16) 






𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2006 0.00565 -19.96 4.467 -10.24 2.380 
 (0.0163) (63.21) (10.33) (17.45) (21.55) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2007 0.232 -20.97 3.416 -4.433 4.933 
 (1.650) (58.04) (12.76) (17.98) (21.06) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2008 0.855 -16.62 1.256 -6.457 2.465 
 (1.650) (58.26) (15.76) (22.84) (21.38) 











𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2009 -0.505 -41.69 -16.40 -38.41** -8.824 
 (1.903) (61.09) (12.59) (15.68) (23.35) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2010 1.490 -76.69 -19.86* -20.77 -18.89 
 (1.893) (55.77) (11.98) (17.22) (23.97) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2011 1.073 -83.31 -27.96*** -25.34 -32.60* 
 (1.715) (54.52) (9.996) (16.79) (19.22) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2012 0.975 -102.8* -46.01*** -25.17 -37.84* 
 (2.102) (54.83) (10.10) (18.00) (20.34) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2013 0.878 -112.8* -49.50*** -22.69 -33.76* 
 (1.640) (61.55) (10.43) (17.46) (19.91) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2014 1.058 -101.6 -51.72*** -17.40 -32.02 
 (2.154) (73.30) (10.06) (17.78) (22.00) 









Service Rev  
($ Million) 
Net Outpatient 
Service Rev  
($ Million) 












𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2015 -0.372 -161.8** -56.30*** -46.88*** -16.60 
 (1.783) (69.77) (12.05) (15.21) (26.85) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2016 -1.516 -205.8** -64.56*** -74.47*** -21.04 
 (1.641) (80.76) (12.00) (23.65) (28.88) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2017 -0.821 -208.6** -63.06*** -65.37*** -24.74 
 (2.882) (97.59) (12.51) (20.85) (35.15) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2018 0 -156.9 -68.40*** -55.32** -29.32 
 (.) (176.8) (15.14) (25.89) (40.12) 
 Observations 956 1164 1164 1164 1162 
Note: Standard error in parentheses. All regressions include hospital and year fixed effects. Pre-reform period 
includes fiscal years 2001–2005 (2003–2005 for operating margin). Transition period includes fiscal years 2006–
2008. Post-reform period includes fiscal years 2009–2018 (2009–2017 for operating margin). Fiscal year 2005 is 











  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 























𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2001 -442.4 64326.0 -78.68 29.41 -3116.1 
 (788.4) (90586.3) (604.4) (90.45) (6683.4) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2002 528.9 11201.6 347.0 -35.73 1218.7 
 (765.3) (58943.4) (815.4) (112.2) (3617.7) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2003 157.3 614.4 685.7 11.05 2228.7 
 (618.3) (56629.2) (523.1) (137.0) (2809.5) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2004 87.34 21668.8 -839.4 -18.81 -3833.5 
 (570.8) (53148.9) (615.0) (139.5) (4175.5) 






𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2006 292.9 3308.9 85.69 -78.48 2159.0 
 (516.5) (34122.7) (443.4) (76.72) (3033.4) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2007 346.2 17201.2 119.2 -56.18 3378.5 
 (554.4) (34334.2) (551.1) (82.20) (3100.4) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2008 -52.10 35220.8 131.7 -81.84 5400.9* 
 (463.0) (30272.8) (617.1) (85.55) (3272.0) 











𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2009 -297.4 48803.2* -927.5** -131.0 7924.9** 
 (483.7) (28679.2) (449.5) (92.70) (3585.7) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2010 -990.8 45877.5 -826.6** -131.1* 10333.9*** 
 (606.6) (28656.0) (381.7) (71.43) (3605.9) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2011 -1231.5** 52666.2* -529.2 -272.6** 9055.2** 
 (503.7) (29526.5) (922.9) (124.6) (3683.7) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2012 -1695.8*** 68349.1** -1514.8*** -163.5** 9967.1*** 
 (378.8) (33174.3) (438.8) (67.08) (3349.0) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2013 -1449.7*** 71377.0* -2226.7*** -150.0** 9363.5*** 
 (421.1) (37281.9) (530.0) (68.14) (3079.6) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2014 -1618.3*** 88308.4* -2309.1*** -165.4** 9992.5*** 
 (467.7) (46833.5) (439.4) (70.30) (3175.7) 



























𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2015 -2218.2*** 108301.3** -2147.9*** -318.9*** 11325.7*** 
 (492.2) (43064.0) (515.8) (78.38) (3421.3) 
 
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2016 -2287.4*** 115340.7** -2721.9*** -420.4*** 12345.1*** 
 (584.3) (46303.9) (552.4) (88.44) (3471.0) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2017 -2207.5*** 123947.1** -3064.1*** -433.0*** 9805.0*** 
 (618.1) (52110.0) (715.2) (91.42) (3617.6) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2018 -2226.1*** 65000.3 -2918.5*** -455.2*** -3347.5 
 (697.9) (50632.6) (752.1) (92.83) (9419.4) 
 Observations 1176 1176 1163 1144 1162 
Note: Standard error in parentheses. All regressions include hospital and year fixed effects. Pre-reform period 
includes fiscal years 2001–2005. Transition period includes fiscal years 2006–2008. Post-reform period includes 







Table. Financial Performance Event Study Results for Hospitals Classified as Safety Net 
under the CMS Definition 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 





Service Rev  
($ Million) 
Net Outpatient 
Service Rev  
($ Million) 












𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2001 0 -186.5 -37.20 -60.99* -63.39 
 (.) (213.4) (28.64) (33.34) (49.83) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2002 0 -127.0 -11.50 -59.03* -32.52 
 (.) (199.2) (27.65) (30.70) (43.29) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2003 0.175 -86.78 -14.67 -44.98* -23.09 
 (1.649) (181.2) (27.99) (26.63) (41.31) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2004 -1.397 -52.71 -30.83 -28.70 -14.21 
 (1.224) (160.9) (23.84) (22.38) (35.35) 






𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2006 -0.116 18.26 11.59 -8.093 20.04 
 (1.123) (136.1) (16.76) (19.17) (28.41) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2007 -1.067 42.98 15.32 -23.15 31.16 
 (1.244) (127.5) (16.04) (28.23) (25.90) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2008 -0.230 114.8 35.62** 7.081 50.65** 
 (1.431) (111.3) (16.06) (19.08) (25.14) 











𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2009 -0.139 206.3* 40.12** 7.851 77.24*** 
 (1.263) (108.4) (16.89) (18.64) (28.43) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2010 1.062 229.1** 15.07 26.47 70.15** 
 (1.254) (110.4) (15.92) (21.53) (27.58) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2011 0.241 227.0** 27.47 11.46 66.05** 
 (1.258) (114.0) (17.66) (17.30) (28.86) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2012 -2.041 229.2* 23.74 9.369 68.88** 
 (1.496) (122.6) (18.54) (18.07) (31.65) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2013 -0.902 252.2* 16.16 15.26 55.04** 
 (1.265) (135.3) (18.98) (17.72) (27.04) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2014 -0.0599 279.7** 19.02 31.74 62.88** 
 (1.638) (140.3) (17.11) (20.48) (28.05) 









Service Rev  
($ Million) 
Net Outpatient 
Service Rev  
($ Million) 












𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2015 -0.824 288.8* 13.16 12.04 65.45** 
 (1.296) (149.6) (17.95) (19.63) (29.12) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2016 -0.708 341.4* 25.12 9.274 81.02** 
 (1.393) (174.3) (23.12) (26.66) (34.24) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2017 -0.481 392.3** 19.22 21.22 91.63** 
 (1.879) (195.5) (24.04) (28.65) (40.51) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2018 0 442.7** 15.95 30.53 85.18** 
 (.) (217.3) (27.06) (30.51) (42.80) 
 Observations 956 1164 1164 1164 1162 
Note: Standard error in parentheses. All regressions include hospital and year fixed effects. Pre-reform period 
includes fiscal years 2001–2005 (2003–2005 for operating margin). Transition period includes fiscal years 2006–
2008. Post-reform period includes fiscal years 2009–2018 (2009–2017 for operating margin). Fiscal year 2005 is 











  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 























𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2001 -854.7 29235.1 -670.5 -81.43 92.51 
 (756.9) (56458.9) (1159.7) (122.8) (4187.2) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2002 -536.2 -4913.3 -17.55 -108.0 2654.2 
 (726.5) (43539.8) (1064.9) (120.3) (2706.5) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2003 -154.6 1409.9 -152.0 -31.59 3036.9 
 (613.3) (41799.9) (1067.6) (115.3) (2421.3) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2004 -190.2 1666.1 -1085.9 13.38 -2167.1 
 (540.5) (36480.0) (898.5) (106.9) (3199.3) 






𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2006 181.1 -1281.5 219.1 -40.37 1279.4 
 (495.4) (26584.8) (660.4) (87.28) (2762.6) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2007 327.1 9967.2 370.9 -81.24 3185.8 
 (512.5) (25312.4) (701.2) (81.81) (2941.2) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2008 163.4 18815.8 670.1 -7.297 5001.0* 
 (483.3) (24617.1) (648.0) (79.02) (2953.4) 











𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2009 379.1 21629.7 135.5 42.71 4613.5 
 (529.1) (22588.4) (594.7) (95.50) (2993.8) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2010 95.01 24229.2 -460.1 18.36 9238.5*** 
 (523.6) (23153.8) (610.1) (87.08) (2728.5) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2011 84.23 29595.3 -396.3 -120.3 7141.2** 
 (659.5) (24235.2) (641.8) (128.9) (2963.4) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2012 -289.2 37290.9 -195.5 -39.32 8062.5*** 
 (524.0) (25578.7) (611.7) (77.32) (3003.9) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2013 -608.6 26374.6 -457.5 -3.262 6450.9** 
 (469.3) (26509.4) (677.3) (74.41) (2775.6) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2014 -1202.9** 35118.8 79.64 -6.840 7718.1*** 
 (608.4) (31200.2) (875.4) (76.89) (2782.3) 



























𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2015 -1289.7** 15506.7 -96.58 -30.08 9823.7*** 
 (621.1) (36972.5) (796.1) (107.7) (2913.7) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2016 -1454.1** 65965.0* 36.85 -241.6** 14792.6*** 
 (626.6) (37439.2) (970.7) (115.3) (3527.0) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2017 -1466.1** 50758.5 -85.74 -160.9 13268.0*** 
 (665.3) (35503.0) (1171.8) (112.5) (3736.8) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2018 -1638.2** 41493.0 172.4 -233.9* 5831.6 
 (754.4) (38475.0) (1339.3) (130.5) (6711.6) 
 Observations 1176 1176 1163 1144 1162 
Note: Standard error in parentheses. All regressions include hospital and year fixed effects. Pre-reform period 
includes fiscal years 2001–2005. Transition period includes fiscal years 2006–2008. Post-reform period includes 







Table. Financial Performance Event Study Results for Hospitals which Self-Reported 
Receiving Supplemental Payments 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
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($ Million) 
Net Outpatient 
Service Rev  
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𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2001 0 -81.36 -7.728 -15.41 -18.74 
 (.) (129.2) (17.33) (25.63) (33.54) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2002 0 -62.82 0.730 -17.25 -11.40 
 (.) (117.9) (15.66) (23.54) (29.00) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2003 -0.00652 -40.70 -6.525 -11.63 -9.162 
 (1.513) (106.3) (15.14) (21.35) (26.98) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2004 -0.894 -10.59 -7.077 -6.469 0.391 
 (1.013) (94.92) (13.45) (18.55) (23.55) 






𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2006 0.0408 13.52 5.761 -0.853 5.115 
 (0.950) (81.03) (10.14) (14.81) (19.04) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2007 0.0205 28.20 6.985 -3.543 9.831 
 (1.026) (74.96) (9.570) (15.71) (16.77) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2008 0.510 52.29 13.26 4.577 14.17 
 (1.069) (69.48) (9.588) (13.41) (16.73) 











𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2009 0.0749 80.43 11.54 1.209 22.79 
 (1.010) (66.38) (10.06) (13.79) (17.76) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2010 -0.136 99.70 7.301 8.057 21.52 
 (1.241) (66.42) (9.416) (14.03) (17.53) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2011 -2.126* 97.17 11.28 -5.528 13.50 
 (1.184) (67.75) (9.938) (13.05) (17.54) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2012 0.00989 101.5 16.04 -2.599 18.85 
 (1.267) (71.98) (10.72) (13.78) (19.08) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2013 -1.891* 138.7* 16.74 -0.528 23.04 
 (1.103) (80.16) (10.80) (14.12) (18.98) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2014 -2.269 148.6* 11.06 8.778 20.88 
 (1.696) (84.85) (10.64) (15.30) (19.88) 
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𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2015 -0.699 186.9** 17.36 6.781 38.34* 
 (1.075) (95.18) (11.91) (16.39) (21.52) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2016 -0.146 207.5* 22.50 2.886 41.68 
 (1.179) (113.6) (14.56) (20.64) (25.75) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2017 0.644 245.0* 17.00 13.17 43.84 
 (1.560) (130.5) (14.82) (24.65) (29.31) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2018 0 290.5* 20.66 7.100 55.07 
 (.) (149.5) (17.53) (28.08) (37.13) 
 Observations 956 1164 1164 1164 1162 
Note: Standard error in parentheses. All regressions include hospital and year fixed effects. Pre-reform period 
includes fiscal years 2001–2005 (2003–2005 for operating margin). Transition period includes fiscal years 2006–
2008. Post-reform period includes fiscal years 2009–2018 (2009–2017 for operating margin). Fiscal year 2005 is 
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𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2001 -1075.4 19824.9 221.1 -171.6 2353.7 
 (718.3) (27397.6) (660.8) (111.1) (3319.6) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2002 -315.6 17886.7 426.4 -174.4 2829.0 
 (567.8) (23968.6) (618.8) (106.6) (2914.9) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2003 -137.7 8279.5 -40.00 -122.9 1212.4 
 (538.1) (24783.4) (616.2) (95.37) (2892.5) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2004 350.6 29552.1 -703.7 -134.6 2588.8 
 (423.7) (20056.5) (563.4) (89.40) (3548.7) 






𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2006 238.0 9064.7 -66.94 -33.84 2937.2 
 (393.7) (17286.0) (463.0) (86.15) (3377.0) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2007 146.3 13996.6 167.2 -83.76 2995.4 
 (395.2) (15594.8) (587.8) (87.03) (3373.3) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2008 58.74 14166.0 179.1 -34.05 1672.1 
 (357.7) (14558.6) (455.9) (79.62) (2981.1) 











𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2009 -9.571 15658.9 -303.9 -48.54 1216.5 
 (365.8) (13911.8) (476.0) (84.36) (3136.3) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2010 -206.4 18447.5 -681.6 -41.15 4816.5* 
 (382.8) (14075.5) (468.7) (77.96) (2709.0) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2011 -196.7 13405.6 -1116.9* 69.72 3868.8 
 (402.0) (14662.2) (595.1) (155.5) (2750.1) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2012 -167.5 24932.9* -560.6 -68.63 4963.5* 
 (352.1) (15051.7) (502.3) (77.94) (2761.6) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2013 -61.15 20414.6 -887.7 -67.79 7841.1*** 
 (406.1) (15896.6) (540.6) (74.45) (2707.9) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2014 -306.1 24504.4 -1393.9** -38.04 9385.3*** 
 (435.2) (17191.0) (623.6) (77.45) (2808.6) 



























𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2015 -101.1 32777.0* -1059.4* -130.6 10365.5*** 
 (458.5) (19192.3) (569.9) (98.83) (3183.4) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2016 -75.13 68310.7*** -1561.7** -256.4** 12612.3*** 
 (493.9) (20400.8) (629.4) (117.2) (3450.3) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2017 -107.6 63960.1*** -2205.2*** -260.6** 13591.8*** 
 (523.9) (19371.6) (791.7) (120.7) (3356.1) 
      
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 × 2018 -278.9 53751.3** -1765.7** -337.8*** 12182.7*** 
 (585.5) (22891.8) (763.2) (125.7) (4259.8) 
 Observations 1176 1176 1163 1144 1162 
Note: Standard error in parentheses. All regressions include hospital and year fixed effects. Pre-reform period 
includes fiscal years 2001–2005. Transition period includes fiscal years 2006–2008. Post-reform period includes 






















Table. Summary Statistics for Control Variables by State Medicaid Expansion Status and 
Chronic Condition Status 
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Note: BRFSS sampling weights are used. All regressions include state×location type and year×location type fixed 
effects as well as the controls. Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. 
*** indicates statistically significant at 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level. In addition, we denote statistically 























































































































































































































Note: BRFSS sampling weights are used. All regressions include state×location type and year×location type fixed 
effects as well as the controls. Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. 
*** indicates statistically significant at 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level. In addition, we denote statistically 

















Drop Cell Phone     








Exclude 19–25 Year-Olds     








Drop ACA Early Expanders     








Drop ACA Late Expanders     








Drop Sample Weights     








200% FPL Threshold     








Note: BRFSS sampling weights are used. All regressions include state×location type and year×location type fixed 
effects as well as the controls Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. 







Table. Specification Checks for Self-Assessed Health 
 
 















































































































Note: BRFSS sampling weights are used. All regressions include state×location type and year×location type fixed 
effects as well as the controls. Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. 








Adam N. Hofer, Jean Marie Abraham, and Ira Moscovice. 2011. “Expansion of Coverage under 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and Primary Care Utilization.” The 
Milbank Quarterly 89 (1): 69. 
 
Aiken, Linda H., Robyn B. Cheung, and Danielle M. Olds. 2009. “Education Policy Initiatives to 
Address the Nurse Shortage in the United States.” Health Affairs (Project Hope) 28 (4): 
w646-656. https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.28.4.w646. 
 
Association of American Medical Colleges. 2019. “The 2019 Update: The Complexities of 
Physician Supply and Demand: Projections from 2017 to 2032.” Physician Workforce 




Auerbach, David I., Peggy G. Chen, Mark W. Friedberg, Rachel O. Reid, Christopher Lau, Peter 
Buerhaus, and Ateev Mehrotra. 2013. “New Approaches for Delivering Primary Care 
Could Reduce Predicted Physician Shortage:” Product Page. RAND Corporation. 2013. 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9752.html. 
 
Bazzoli, Gloria J., and Jan P. Clement. 2014. “The Experiences of Massachusetts Hospitals as 
Statewide Health Insurance Reform Was Implemented.” Journal of Health Care for the 
Poor and Underserved 25 (1A): 63–78. https://doi.org/10.1353/hpu.2014.0073. 
 
Benitez, Joseph A., Liza Creel, and J’Aime Jennings. 2016. Kentucky’s Medicaid expansion 
showing early promise on coverage and access to care. Health Affairs 35(3): 528–34. 
 
Berchick, Edward R., Jessica C. Barnett, and Rachel D. Upton. 2019. Current Population 
Reports, P60-267(RV), Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2018, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, DC. 
 
Berk, Marc L. 2016. “The Need For Ongoing Surveys About Physician Practice Costs.” Health 
Affairs 35 (9): 1647–50. https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2016.0389. 
 
Bodenheimer, Thomas S., and Mark D. Smith. 2013. “Primary Care: Proposed Solutions To The 
Physician Shortage Without Training More Physicians.” Health Affairs 32 (11): 1881–86. 
https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2013.0234. 
 
Borgschulte, Mark and Jacob Vogler. 2019. Did the ACA Medicaid expansion save lives? IZA 
Discussion Paper No. 12552. 
 
Brown, Douglas M. 1988. “Do Physicians Underutilize Aides?” The Journal of Human 




Buchmueller, Thomas C., Zachary M. Levinson, Helen G. Levy, and Barbara L. Wolfe. 2016. 
Effect of the Affordable Care Act on racial and ethnic disparities in health insurance 
coverage. American Journal of Public Health 106: 1416-1421. 
 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. 2019. “Medicaid Program; State Disproportionate 




Chatterjee, Paula, Benjamin D Sommers, and Karen E Joynt Maddox. 2020. “Essential but 
Undefined - Reimagining How Policymakers Identify Safety-Net Hospitals.” The New 
England Journal of Medicine 383 (27): 2593–95. 
https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMp2030228. 
 
Clemens, Jeffrey, and Joshua D. Gottlieb. 2017. “In the Shadow of a Giant: Medicare’s Influence 
on Private Physician Payments.” Journal of Political Economy 125 (1): 1–39. 
https://doi.org/10.1086/689772. 
 
Collins Sara R, Munira Z. Gunja, Michelle M. Doty, Herman K. Bhupal. 2018. First Look at 
Health Insurance Coverage in 2018 Finds ACA Gains Beginning to Reverse. New York, 
NY: Commonwealth Fund. https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2018/first-look-
health-insurance-coverage-2018-finds-aca-gains-beginning-reverse. Accessed April 19. 
2020. 
 
Conrad, Douglas A, Anne Sales, Su-Ying Liang, Anoshua Chaudhuri, Charles Maynard, Lisa 
Pieper, Laurel Weinstein, David Gans, and Neill Piland. 2002. “The Impact of Financial 
Incentives on Physician Productivity in Medical Groups.” Health Services Research 37 
(4): 885–906. https://doi.org/10.1034/j.1600-0560.2002.57.x. 
 
Corallo, Bradley, Robin Rudowitz, and Rachel Garfield. 2021. “New Incentive for States to 




Courtemanche, Charles J., Andrew Friedson, Andrew Koller, and Daniel I. Rees, 2019c. The 
Affordable Care Act and ambulance response times. Journal of Health Economics 67: 
article 102213. 
 
Courtemanche, Charles, Ishtiaque Fazlul, James Marton, Benjamin Ukert, Aaron Yelowitz, and 
Daniela Zapata. (2020a). The Impact of the Affordable Care Act on Disparities in 
Insurance Coverage After Four Years, in Medicaid: Enrollment, Eligibility, and Key 
Issues, D. Lanford (editor), Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science Publishers.   
 
Courtemanche, Charles, James Marton, and Aaron Yelowitz. 2016. Who gained insurance 





Courtemanche, Charles, James Marton, and Aaron Yelowitz. 2020a. Medicaid Coverage Across 
the Income Distribution under the Affordable Care Act, in Medicaid: Enrollment, 




Courtemanche, Charles, James Marton, and Aaron Yelowitz. 2020b. The Full Impact of the ACA 
on Political Participation. Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences, 
forthcoming. 
 
Courtemanche, Charles, James Marton, Benjamin Ukert, Aaron Yelowitz, and Daniela Zapata. 
2017. Early impacts of the Affordable Care Act on health insurance coverage in Medicaid 
expansion and non-expansion states. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 36(1): 
178–210. 
 
Courtemanche, Charles, James Marton, Benjamin Ukert, Aaron Yelowitz, and Daniela Zapata. 
2018a. Early effects of the Affordable Care Act on health care access, risky health 
behaviors, and self-assessed health. Southern Economic Journal 84(3): 660–691. 
 
Courtemanche, Charles, James Marton, Benjamin Ukert, Aaron Yelowitz, and Daniela Zapata. 
2018b. Effects of the Affordable Care Act on health care access and self-assessed health 
after 3 years. Inquiry 55: 1–10. 
 
Courtemanche, Charles, James Marton, Benjamin Ukert, Aaron Yelowitz, and Daniela Zapata. 
2019a. Effects of the Affordable Care Act on health behaviors after 3 years. Eastern 
Economic Journal 45: 7-33. 
 
Courtemanche, Charles, James Marton, Benjamin Ukert, Aaron Yelowitz, and Daniela Zapata. 
(2020b). The Impact of the ACA on Health Care Access and Self-Assessed Health in the 
Trump Era (2017-2018). Health Services Research, forthcoming. 
 
Courtemanche, Charles, James Marton, Benjamin Ukert, Aaron Yelowitz, Daniela Zapata, and 
Ishtiaque Fazlul. 2019b. The three-year impact of the Affordable Care Act on disparities 
in insurance coverage. Health Services Research 54: 307-316. 
 
DeFelice, Lisa C., and W. David Bradford. 1997. “Relative Inefficiencies in Production between 
Solo and Group Practice Physicians.” Health Economics 6 (5): 455–65. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-1050(199709)6:5<455::AID-HEC290>3.0.CO;2-S. 
 
DeSalvo, Karen B., Nicole Bloser, Kristi Reynolds, Jiang He, and Paul Muntner. 2006. Mortality 
prediction with a single general self-rated health question. Journal of General Internal 




Diewert, W. E. 1971. “An Application of the Shephard Duality Theorem: A Generalized 
Leontief Production Function.” Journal of Political Economy 79 (3): 481–507. 
https://doi.org/10.1086/259764. 
 
Dill, Michael J., Stacie Pankow, Clese Erikson, and Scott Shipman. 2013. “Survey Shows 
Consumers Open To A Greater Role For Physician Assistants And Nurse Practitioners.” 
Health Affairs 32 (6): 1135–42. https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2012.1150. 
 
Division of Health Care Finance and Policy. 2007. “Health Safety Net 2007 Annual Report.” 
Boston, MA: Divison of Health Care Finance and Policy. 
https://archives.lib.state.ma.us/handle/2452/47837. 
 
Division of Health Care Finance and Policy. 2008. “Health Safety Net 2008 Annual Report.” 
Boston, MA: Divison of Health Care Finance and Policy. 
https://archives.lib.state.ma.us/handle/2452/47830. 
 
Frean, Molly, Jonathan Gruber, and Benjamin D. Sommers. 2017. Premium subsidies, the 
mandate, and Medicaid expansion: Coverage effects of the Affordable Care Act. Journal 
of Health Economics 53: 72-86. 
 
Gaynor, Martin, and Mark V. Pauly. 1990. “Compensation and Productive Efficiency in 
Partnerships: Evidence from Medical Groups Practice.” Journal of Political Economy 98 
(3): 544–73. https://doi.org/10.1086/261694. 
 
Golberstein, Ezra, Gilbert Gonzales, and Benjamin D. Sommers. 2015. California’s early ACA 
expansion increased coverage and reduced out-of-pocket spending for the state’s low-
income population. Health Affairs 34: 1688–94. 
 
Goldin Jacob, Ithai Z. Lurie, and Janet McCubbin. Health Insurance and Mortality: Experimental 
Evidence from Taxpayer Outreach. 2019. NBER Working Paper 26533.  
 
Graves, John A., Laura A. Hatfield, William Blot, Nancy L. Keating, and J. Michael 
McWilliams. 2020. Medicaid expansion slowed rates of health decline for low-income 
adults in Southern states. Health Affairs 39(1): xxx-xxx. 
 
Gruber, Jonathan and Benjamin D. Sommers, 2019. The Affordable Care Act’s effects on 
patients, providers, and the economy: What we’ve learned so far. Journal of Policy 
Analysis and Management 38(4): 1028-1052. 
 
Headen, Alvin E. 1991. “Productivity Enhancing Customer Delay: Estimates from Physician 
Data Corrected for Measurement Error.” Southern Economic Journal 58 (2): 445–58. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/1060186. 
 
Heim, Bradley, Ithai Z. Lurie, Daniel W. Sacks. 2018. Does the individual mandate affect 




Hinde, Jesse M. 2017. Incentive(less)? The effectiveness of tax credits and cost-sharing subsidies 
in the Affordable Care Act. American Journal of Health Economics 3(3): 346–369.   
 
Horrocks, S. 2002. “Systematic Review of Whether Nurse Practitioners Working in Primary 
Care Can Provide Equivalent Care to Doctors.” BMJ 324 (7341): 819–23. 
https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.324.7341.819. 
 
Hurdle, Sylvia, and Gregory C. Pope. 1989. “Physician Productivity: Trends and Determinants.” 
Inquiry 26 (1): 100–115. 
 
Idler, Ellen L., and Yael Benyamini. 1997. Self-rated health and mortality: A review of twenty-
seven community studies. Journal of Health and Social Behavior 38(1): 21–37. 
 
“June 2009 Report to Congress: Improving Incentives in the Medicare Program.” 2009. The 
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission. http://www.medpac.gov/docs/default-
source/reports/Jun09_EntireReport.pdf. 
 
Juraschek, Stephen P., Xiaoming Zhang, Vinoth Ranganathan, and Vernon W. Lin. 2019. 
“United States Registered Nurse Workforce Report Card and Shortage Forecast.” 
American Journal of Medical Quality: The Official Journal of the American College of 
Medical Quality 34 (5): 473–81. https://doi.org/10.1177/1062860619873217. 
 
Kaestner, Robert, Bowen Garrett, J. Chen, Anui Gangopadhyaya, and Caitlyn Fleming. 2017. 
Effects of the ACA Medicaid expansion on health insurance coverage and labor supply. 
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 36(3): 608–42. 
 
Kirby, James B., and Jessica P. Vistnes. 2016. Access to care improved for people who gained 
Medicaid or marketplace coverage in 2014. Health Affairs 35(10): 1830–4. 
 
Kirch, Darrell G., Mackenzie K. Henderson, and Michael J. Dill. 2012. “Physician Workforce 
Projections in an Era of Health Care Reform.” Annual Review of Medicine 63 (February): 
435. 
 
Kirchhoff, Suzanne M. 2013. “Physician Practices: Background, Organization, and Market 
Consolidation.” Congressional Research Service. 
 
Kowalski, Amanda. 2014. The early impact of the Affordable Care Act state-by-state. NBER 
Working Paper 20597. 
 
Ku, Leighton, Emily Jones, Peter Shin, Fraser Rothenberg Byrne, and Sharon K. Long. 2011. 
“Safety-Net Providers After Health Care Reform: Lessons From Massachusetts.” 
Archives of Internal Medicine 171 (15): 6. 
 
Kurtzman, Ellen T., and Burt S. Barnow. 2017. “A Comparison of Nurse Practitioners, Physician 
Assistants, and Primary Care Physicians’ Patterns of Practice and Quality of Care in 
128 
 
Health Centers:” Medical Care 55 (6): 615–22. 
https://doi.org/10.1097/MLR.0000000000000689. 
 
Laugesen, Miriam J. 2014. “The Resource-Based Relative Value Scale and Physician 
Reimbursement Policy.” Chest 146 (5): 1413–19. https://doi.org/10.1378/chest.13-2367. 
 
Lopes, Mário Amorim, Álvaro Santos Almeida, and Bernardo Almada-Lobo. 2015. “Handling 
Healthcare Workforce Planning with Care: Where Do We Stand?” Human Resources for 
Health 13 (1): 38. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12960-015-0028-0. 
 
Lovink, Marleen H., Anke Persoon, Raymond T.C.M. Koopmans, Anneke J.A.H. Van Vught, 
Lisette Schoonhoven, and Miranda G.H. Laurant. 2017. “Effects of Substituting Nurse 
Practitioners, Physician Assistants or Nurses for Physicians Concerning Healthcare for 
the Ageing Population: A Systematic Literature Review.” Journal of Advanced Nursing 
73 (9): 2084–2102. https://doi.org/10.1111/jan.13299. 
 
McMorrow, Stacey, Genevieve M. Kenney, Sharon K. Long, and Jason A. Gates. 2016. 
Marketplaces helped drive coverage gains in 2015; Affordability problems remained. 
Health Affairs 35(10): 1810–15. 
 
Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access Commission. 2016. “Report to Congress on Medicaid 
Disproportionate Share Hospital Payments.” Washington, DC: Medicaid and CHIP 
Payment and Access Commission. https://www.macpac.gov/publication/report-to-
congress-on-medicaid-disproportionate-share-hospital-payments/. 
 
Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access Commission. 2020a. “Annual Analysis of 
Disproportionate Share Hospital Allotments to States.” Washington, DC: Medicaid and 
CHIP Payment and Access Commission. https://www.macpac.gov/publication/march-
2020-analysis-of-disproportionate-share-hospital-allotments-to-states/. 
 




Miller, Sarah and Laura R. Wherry. 2017. Health and access to care during the first 2 years of the 
ACA Medicaid expansions. New England Journal of Medicine 376: 947-956. 
 
Miller, Sarah, Norman Johnson, N. and Laura R. Wherry. 2020. Medicaid and Mortality: New 
Evidence from Linked Survey and Administrative Data. NBER Working Paper 26081. 
 
Mohan, Arun, Jennifer Grant, Maren Batalden, and Danny McCormick. 2013. “The Health of 
Safety Net Hospitals Following Massachusetts Health Care Reform: Changes in Volume, 
Revenue, Costs, and Operating Margins from 2006 to 2009.” International Journal of 




Musumeci, Mary Beth. 2012. “A Guide to the Supreme Court’s Decision on the ACA’s 
Medicaid Expansion.” Focus on Health Reform. 
 
Myerson, Rebecca and Samuel Crawford. 2020. Coverage for Adults with Chronic Disease 
Under the First 5 Years of the Affordable Care Act. Medical Care 58(10): 861-866. 
 
Obama, Barack. 2016. “United States Health Care Reform: Progress to Date and Next Steps.” 
JAMA 316 (5): 525–32. https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2016.9797. 
 
Office of Medicaid. 2012. “Health Safety Net 2012 Annual Report.” Executive Office of Health 
and Human Services. https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2016/07/uc/hsn-01-13-
ar.pdf. 
 
Olsen, Kim Rose, Dorte Gyrd-Hansen, Torben Højmark Sørensen, Troels Kristensen, Peter 
Vedsted, and Andrew Street. 2013. “Organisational Determinants of Production and 
Efficiency in General Practice: A Population-Based Study.” The European Journal of 
Health Economics 14 (2): 267–76. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10198-011-0368-1. 
 
Oregon Health Study Group, Finkelstein Amy, Taubman Sarah, Wright Bill, Bernstein Mira, 
Gruber Jonathan, Newhouse Joseph P., Allen Heidi, and Baicker Katherine. 2012. “The 
Oregon Health Insurance Experiment: Evidence from the First Year.” The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 127 (3): 1057–1106. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjs020. 
 
Petterson, S. M., W. R. Liaw, C. Tran, and A. W. Bazemore. 2015. “Estimating the Residency 
Expansion Required to Avoid Projected Primary Care Physician Shortages by 2035.” The 
Annals of Family Medicine 13 (2): 107–14. https://doi.org/10.1370/afm.1760. 
 
Petterson, S. M., W. R. Liaw, R. L. Phillips, D. L. Rabin, D. S. Meyers, and A. W. Bazemore. 
2012. “Projecting US Primary Care Physician Workforce Needs: 2010-2025.” The Annals 
of Family Medicine 10 (6): 503–9. https://doi.org/10.1370/afm.1431. 
 
Phillips, Anna C., Geoff Der, and Douglas Carroll. 2010. Self-reported health, self-reported 
fitness, and all-cause mortality: Prospective cohort study. British Journal of Health 
Psychology 15(2): 337–46. 
 
“The Physician Workforce: Projections and Research into Current Issues Affecting Supply and 




Rao, Sandhya K., Alexa B. Kimball, Sara R. Lehrhoff, Michael K. Hidrue, Deborah G. Colton, 
Timothy G. Ferris, and David F. Torchiana. 2017. “The Impact of Administrative Burden 
on Academic Physicians: Results of a Hospital-Wide Physician Survey.” Academic 




Reinhardt, U. 1972. “A Production Function for Physician Services.” The Review of Economics 
and Statistics 54 (1): 55. https://doi.org/10.2307/1927495. 
 
Salsberg, Edward (HRSA). 2013. “Projecting the Supply and Demand for Primary Care 
Practitioners Through 2020.” United States Workforce Projections. HRSA, Bureau of 
Health Workforce. 
 
Sarma, Sisira, Rose Anne Devlin, and William Hogg. 2009. “Physician’s Production of Primary 
Care in Ontario, Canada.” Health Economics, n/a-n/a. https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.1447. 
 
Sarzynski, Erin, and Henry Barry. 2019. “Current Evidence and Controversies: Advanced 
Practice Providers in Healthcare.” American Journal of Managed Care 8 (25): 366–68. 
 
Shartzer, Adele, Sharon K. Long, and Nathaniel Anderson. 2016. Access to care and 
affordability have improved following Affordable Care Act implementation; Problems 
remain. Health Affairs 35(1): 161-168. 
 
Sibbald, B., M. Laurant, and A. Scott. 2006. “Changing Task Profiles.” In Primary Care in the 
Drivers Seat? Organizational Reform in European Primary Care., edited by W. Boerma, 
R. Saltman, and A. Rico. Maidenhead: Open University Press. 
 
Simon, Kosali, Aparna Soni, and John Cawley. 2017. The impact of health insurance on 
preventive care and health behaviors: Evidence from the first two years of the ACA 
Medicaid expansions. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 36: 390–417. 
 





Snyder, Laura, Julia Paradise, and Robin Rudowitz. 2014. The ACA primary care increase: State 




Sommers, Benjamin D., Bethany Maylone, Robert J. Blendon, E. John Orav, and Arnold M. 
Epstein. 2017. Three-Year Impacts of the Affordable Care Act: Improved Medical Care 
and Health Among Low-Income Adults. Health Affairs 36(6): 1119-1128. 
 
Sommers, Benjamin D., Genevieve M. Kenney, and Arnold M. Epstein. 2014. New evidence on 
the Affordable Care Act: Coverage impacts of early Medicaid expansions. Health Affairs 
33(1): 78–87. 
 
Sommers, Benjamin D., Katherine Baicker, and Arnold M. Epstein. 2012. Mortality and access 





Sommers, Benjamin D., Munnira Z. Gunja, Kenneth Finegold, and Thomas Musco. 2015. 
Changes in self-reported insurance coverage, access to care, and health under the 
Affordable Care Act. Journal of the American Medical Association 314(4): 366–74. 
 
Sommers, Benjamin D., Robert J. Blendon, and E. John Orav. 2016. Both the “private option” 
and traditional Medicaid expansions improved access to care for low-income adults. 
Health Affairs 35(1): 96–105. 
 
Soni, Aparna, Laura R. Wherry, and Kosali Simon. 2020. How have ACA insurance expansions 
affected health outcomes? Findings from the literature. Health Affairs 39(3): xxx-xxx. 
 
Staiger, Douglas O. 2010. “Trends in the Work Hours of Physicians in the United States.” JAMA 
303 (8): 747. https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2010.168. 
 
Sullivan, Gregory W. 2009. “Ongoing Analysis of the Health Safety Net Trust Fund: Medicare 
Based Claims Payment System Implementation.” OIG Reports and Recommendations. 
Boston, MA: Massachusetts Office of the Inspector General. 
https://www.mass.gov/service-details/oig-reports-and-recommendations. 
 
The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation. 2012. “Massachusetts Health Care Reform: Six Years 
Later.” The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation. https://www.kff.org/health-costs/issue-
brief/massachusetts-health-care-reform-six-years-later/. 
 
The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation. 2019. “Status of State Action on the Medicaid 
Expansion Decision.” September 2019. https://www.kff.org/health-reform/state-
indicator/state-activity-around-expanding-medicaid-under-the-affordable-care-act/. 
 
The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation. State Decisions on Health Insurance Marketplaces and 
the Medicaid Expansion. Available at http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-
decisions-for-creating-health-insurance-exchanges-and-expanding-medicaid/. Accessed 
April 19, 2020. 
 
Thurston, Norman K, and Anne M. Libby. 2002. “A Production Function for Physician Services 
Revisited.” Review of Economics and Statistics 84 (1): 184–91. 
https://doi.org/10.1162/003465302317332017. 
 
Vespa, Jonathan, Lauren Medina, and David M Armstrong. 2020. “Demographic Turning Points 
for the United States: Population Projections for 2020 to 2060.” Current Population 
Reports. Washington, DC: Census Bureau. 
 
Wehby George L. and Wei Lyu. 2018. The impact of the ACA Medicaid expansions on health 
insurance coverage through 2015 and coverage disparities by Age, race/ethnicity, and 




Wherry, Laura R., and Sarah Miller. 2016. Early coverage, access, utilization, and health effects 
associated with the Affordable Care Act Medicaid expansions: A quasi-experimental 
study. Annals of Internal Medicine 164(12): 795–803. 
 
Yang, Yihan, Qi Long, Sandra L. Jackson, Mary K. Rhee, Anne Tomolo, Darin Olson, and 
Lawrence S. Phillips. 2018. “Nurse Practitioners, Physician Assistants, and Physicians 
Are Comparable in Managing the First Five Years of Diabetes.” The American Journal of 
Medicine 131 (3): 276-283.e2. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amjmed.2017.08.026. 
 
Yue, Dahai, Petra W. Rasmussen, Ninez A. Ponce. 2018. Racial/ethnic differential effects of 
Medicaid expansion on health care access. Health Services Research 53(5): 3640-3656.  
 
Zhang, Xiaoming, Daniel Lin, Hugh Pforsich, and Vernon W. Lin. 2020. “Physician Workforce 
in the United States of America: Forecasting Nationwide Shortages.” Human Resources 
for Health 18 (1): 1–9. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12960-020-0448-3. 
 
Zuckerman, Stephen, and Dana Goin. 2012. “How Much Will Medicaid Physician Fees for 
Primary Care Rise in 2013? Evidence from a 2012 Survey of Medicaid Physician Fees.” 




Zuckerman, Stephen, Laura Skopec, and Kristen McCormack. 2014. “Reversing the Medicaid 
Fee Bump: How Much Could Medicaid Physician Fees for Primary Care Fall in 2015?” 
Urban Institute, December. https://www.urban.org/research/publication/reversing-
medicaid-fee-bump-how-much-could-medicaid-physician-fees-primary-care-fall-2015. 
 
Zuckerman, Stephen, Laura Skopec, and Marni Epstein. 2017. “Medicaid Physician Fees after 









Derek Ryan Hoodin was born on January 12, 1994 in Cincinnati, Ohio, United States. He 
graduated with his Ph.D. in Economics from the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies at 
Georgia State University in 2021. He also received an M.A. in Economics from Georgia State in 
2019, and a B.S. in Quantitative Economics and a B.A. in Mathematics from Miami University 
in 2016. While at Georgia State, Derek was awarded the Dean’s Fellowship and worked as a 
graduate research assistant for Louis Perrault and James Marton. He specializes broadly in 
supply-side Health Economics, as well as Labor and Education Economics. In July, he will join 
Abt Associates as a senior analyst. 
